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Abstract
We study the complexity of (approximate) winner determination under the Monroe
and Chamberlin–Courant multiwinner voting rules, which determine the set of represen-
tatives by optimizing the total (dis)satisfaction of the voters with their representatives.
The total (dis)satisfaction is calculated either as the sum of individual (dis)satisfactions
(the utilitarian case) or as the (dis)satisfaction of the worst off voter (the egalitarian
case). We provide good approximation algorithms for the satisfaction-based utilitarian
versions of the Monroe and Chamberlin–Courant rules, and inapproximability results
for the dissatisfaction-based utilitarian versions of them and also for all egalitarian
cases. Our algorithms are applicable and particularly appealing when voters submit
truncated ballots. We provide experimental evaluation of the algorithms both on real-
life preference-aggregation data and on synthetic data. These experiments show that
our simple and fast algorithms can in many cases find near-perfect solutions.
1 Introduction
We study the complexity of (approximate) winner determination under the Monroe [32]
and Chamberlin–Courant [10] multiwinner voting rules, which aim at selecting a group of
candidates that best represent the voters. Multiwinner elections are important both for
human societies (e.g., in indirect democracies for electing committees of representatives like
parliaments) and for software multiagent systems (e.g., for recommendation systems [25]),
and thus it is important to have good multiwinner rules and good algorithms for them. The
Monroe and Chamberlin–Courant rules are particularly appealing because they create an
explicit (and, in some sense, optimal) connection between the elected committee members
and the voters; each voter knows his or her representative and each committee member
knows to whom he or she is accountable. In the context of recommendation systems this
∗This paper combines and extends results presented at IJCAI-2013 (paper titled “Fully Proportional
Representation as Resource Allocation: Approximability Results”; the paper contained most of our theo-
retical results) and at AAMAS-2012 (paper titled “Achieving Fully Proportional Representation is Easy in
Practice”; the paper contained most of our experimental results).
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means that every selected item is personalized, i.e., recommended to a particular user.
Moreover, the Monroe rule ensures the proportionality of the representation. We assume
that m candidates participate in the election and that the society consists of n voters, who
each rank the candidates, expressing their preferences about who they would like to see as
their representative.
When choosing a K-member committee, the Monroe and Chamberlin–Courant rules
work as follows. For each voter they assign a single candidate as their representative,
respecting the following rules:
(a) altogether exactly K candidates are assigned to the voters. For the Monroe rule, each
candidate is assigned either to about n
K
voters or to none; for the Chamberlin–Courant
rule there is no such restriction and each committee member might be representing
a different number of voters. The committee should take this into account in its
operation, i.e., by means of weighted voting.
(b) the candidates are selected and assigned to the voters optimally minimizing the total
(societal) dissatisfaction or maximizing the total (societal) satisfaction.
The total (dis)satisfaction is calculated on the basis of individual (dis)satisfactions. We
assume that there is a function α : N→ N such that α(i) measures how well a voter is rep-
resented by the candidate that this voter ranks as i’th best. The function α is the same for
each voter. We can view α either as a satisfaction function (then it should be a decreasing
one) or as a dissatisfaction function (then it should be an increasing one). For example, it is
typical to use the Borda count scoring function whose m-candidate dissatisfaction variant is
defined as αmB,inc = i− 1, and whose satisfaction variant is α
m
B,dec = m− i. In the utilitarian
variants of the rules, the assignment should maximize (minimize) the total satisfaction (dis-
satisfaction) calculated as the sum of the voters’ individual satisfactions (dissatisfactions)
with their representatives. In the egalitarian variants, the assignment should maximize
(minimize) the total satisfaction (dissatisfaction) calculated as the satisfaction (dissatisfac-
tion) of the worst-off voter.
The Monroe and Chamberlin–Courant rules create a useful connection between the
voters and their representatives that makes it possible to achieve both candidates’ account-
ability to the voters, and proportional representation of voters’ views. Among common
voting rules, the Monroe and Chamberlin–Courant rules seem to be unique in having both
the accountability and the proportionality properties simultaneously. For example, First
Past the Post system (where the voters are partitioned into districts with a separate single-
winner Plurality election in each) can give very disproportionate results (forcing some of the
voters to be represented by candidates they dislike). On the other side of the spectrum are
the party-list systems, which achieve perfect proportionality. In those systems the voters
vote for the parties, based on these votes each party receives some number of seats in the
parliament, and then each party distributes the seats among its members (usually following
a publicly available list of the party’s candidates). This makes the elected candidates feel
more accountable to apparatchiks of their parties than to the voters. Somewhere between
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the First Past the Post system and the party-list systems, we have the single transferable
vote rule (STV), but for STV it is difficult to tell which candidate represents which voters.
Unfortunately, the Monroe and Chamberlin–Courant rules have one crucial drawback
that makes them impractical. It is NP-hard to tell who the winners are! Specifically, NP-
hardness of winner determination under the Monroe and Chamberlin–Courant rules was
shown by Procaccia et al. [37] and by Lu and Boutilier [25]. Worse yet, the hardness holds
even if various natural parameters of the election are small [7]. Rare easy cases include
those, where the committee to be elected is small, or we consider the Chamberlin–Courant
rule and the voters have single-peaked [7] or single-crossing preferences [43].
Lu and Boutilier [25] proposed to use approximation algorithms and have given the first
such algorithm for the Chamberlin–Courant system. Their procedure outputs an assignment
that achieves no less than 1− 1
e
≈ 0.63 fraction of the optimal voter satisfaction. However,
the approximation ratio 0.63 here means that it is possible that, on average, each agent
is represented by a candidate that this agent prefers to only about 63% of the candidates,
even if there is a perfect solution that assigns each agent to their most preferred candidate.
Such issues, however, would not occurr if we had a constant-factor approximation algorithm
minimizing the total dissatisfaction. Indeed, if a perfect solution exists, then the optimal
dissatisfaction is zero and a constant-factor approximation algorithm must also output this
perfect solution.
The use of approximation algorithms in real-life applications requires some discussion.
For example, their use is naturally justified in the context of recommendation systems. Here
the strive for optimality is not crucial since a good but not optimal recommendation still
has useful information and nobody would object if we replaced the exact recommendation
with an approximate one (given that the exact one is hard to calculate). For example,
Amazon.com may recommend you a book on gardening which may not be the best book
for you on this topic, but still full of useful advice. For such situations, Herbert Simon [41]
used the term ‘satisficing,’ instead of optimizing, to explain the behavior of decision makers
under circumstances in which an optimal solution cannot be easily determined. On page
129 he wrote: “Evidently, organisms adapt well enough to satisfice; they do not, in general,
‘optimize’.” Effectively, what Simon says is that the use of approximation algorithms fits
well with the human nature.
Still, the use of approximation algorithms in elections requires some care. It is con-
ceivable that the electoral commission finds an allocation of voters to candidates with a
certain value of (dis)satisfaction and one of the parties participating in the election finds an
allocation with a better value. This can lead to a political deadlock. There are two ways of
avoiding this. Firstly, an approximation algorithm can be fixed by law. In such a case, it
becomes an acting voting rule and a new way to measure fairness in the society. Secondly,
an electoral commission may calculate the allocation, but also publish the raw data and
issue a call for submissions. If, within the period specified by law, nobody can produce
a better allocation, then the committee goes ahead and announces the result. If someone
produces a better allocation, then the electoral commission uses the latter one.
The use of approximation algorithms is even more natural in elections with partial
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ballots. Indeed, even if we use an exact algorithm to calculate the winners, the results
will be approximate anyway since the voters provide us with approximations of their real
preferences and not with their exact preferences.
1.1 Our Results
In this paper we focus on approximation algorithms for winner determination under the
Monroe and Chamberlin–Courant rules. Our first goal is to seek algorithms that find
assignments for which the dissatisfaction of voters is within a fixed bound of the optimal
one. Unfortunately, we have shown that under standard complexity-theoretic assumptions
such algorithms do not exist. Nonetheless, we found good algorithms that maximize voter’s
satisfaction. Specifically, we have obtained the following results:
1. The Monroe and Chamberlin–Courant rules are hard to approximate up to any con-
stant factor for the dissatisfaction-based cases (both utilitarian and egalitarian ones;
see Theorems 1, 2, 3 and 4) and for the satisfaction-based egalitarian cases (see The-
orems 5 and 7).
2. For the satisfaction-based utilitarian framework we show the following. For the Mon-
roe rule with the Borda scoring function we give a (0.715−ǫ)-approximation algorithm
(often, the ratio is much better; see Section 4). In case of an arbitrary positional
scoring function we give a (1 − 1
e
)-approximation algorithm (Theorem 13). For the
Chamberlin–Courant rule with the Borda scoring function we give a polynomial-time
approximation scheme (that is, for each ǫ, 0 < ǫ < 1, we have a polynomial-time
(1− ǫ)-approximation algorithm; see Theorem 15).
3. We provide empirical evaluation of our algorithms for the satisfaction-based utilitarian
framework, both on synthetic and real-life data. This evaluation shows that in practice
our best algorithms achieve at least 0.9 approximation ratios, and even better results
are typical (see Section 5).
4. We show that our algorithms work very well in the setting where voters do not nec-
essarily rank all the candidates, but only provide the so-called truncated ballots, in
which they rank several most preferred candidates (usually at least three). We provide
theoretical guarantees on the performance of our algorithms (Propositions 10 and 16)
as well as empirical evaluation (see Section 5.4).
Our results show that, as long as one is willing to accept approximate solutions, it is
possible to use the utilitarian variants of the Monroe and Chamberlin–Courant rules in
practice. This view is justified both from the theoretical and from the empirical point of
view. Due to our negative results, we did not perform empirical evaluation for the egalitarian
variants of the rules, but we believe that this is an interesting future research direction.
1.2 Related Work
A large number of papers are related to our research in terms of methodology (the study of
computational complexity and approximation algorithms for winner determination under
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various NP-hard election rules), in terms of perspective and motivation (e.g., due to the
resource allocation view of Monroe and Chamberlin–Courant rules that we take), and in
terms of formal similarity (e.g., winner determination under the Chamberlin–Courant rule
can be seen as a form of the facility location problem). Below we review this related
literature.
There are several single-winner voting rules for which winner determination is known to
be NP-hard. These rules include, for example, Dodgson’s rule [3,6,20], Young’s rule [6,38],
and Kemeny’s rule [3,5,21]. For the single-transferable vote rule (STV), the winner determi-
nation problem becomes NP-hard if we use the so-called parallel-universes tie-breaking [12].
Many of these hardness results hold even in the sense of parameterized complexity theory
(however, there also is a number of fixed-parameter tractability results; see the references
above for details).
These hardness results motivated the search for approximation algorithms. There are
now very good approximation algorithms for Kemeny’s rule [1,13,24] and for Dodgson’s
rule [8,9,16,22,30]. In both cases the results are, in essence, optimal. For Kemeny’s rule
there is a polynomial-time approximation scheme [24] and for Dodgson’s rule the achieved
approximation ratio is optimal under standard complexity-theoretic assumptions [8] (un-
fortunately, the approximation ratio is not constant but depends logarithmically on the
number of candidates). On the other hand, for Young’s rule it is known that no good
approximation algorithms exist [8].
The work of Caragiannis et al. [9] and of Faliszewski et al. [16] on approximate winner
determination for Dodgson’s rule is particularly interesting from our perspective. In the
former, the authors advocate treating approximation algorithms for Dodgson’s rule as voting
rules in their own right and design them to have desirable properties. In the latter, the
authors show that a well-established voting rule (so-called Maximin rule) is a reasonable
(though not optimal) approximation of Dodgson’s rule. This perspective is important for
anyone interested in using approximation algorithms for winner determination in elections
(as might be the case for our algorithms for the Monroe and Chamberlin–Courant rules).
The hardness of the winner determination problem for the Monroe and Chamberlin–
Courant rules have been considered in several papers. Procaccia, Rosenschein and Zohar [37]
were the first to show the hardness of these two rules for the case of a particular approval-
style dissatisfaction function. Their results were complemented by Lu and Boutilier [25],
Betzler, Slinko and Uhlmann [7], Yu, Chan, and Elkind [45], Skowron et al. [43], and
Skowron and Faliszewski [42]. These are showing the hardness in case of the Borda dissat-
isfaction function, obtain results on parameterized hardness of the two rules, and results on
hardness (or easiness) for the cases where the profiles are single-peaked or single-crossing.
Further, Lu and Boutilier [25] initiated the study of approximability for the Chamberlin–
Courant rule (and were the first to use satisfaction-based framework). Specifically, they
gave the (1 − 1
e
)-approximation algorithm for the Chamberlin–Courant rule. The motiva-
tion of Lu and Boutilier was coming from the point of view of recommendation systems
and, in that sense, our view of the rules is quite similar to theirs.
In this paper we take the view that the Monroe and Chamberlin–Courant rules are
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special cases of the following resource allocation problem. The alternatives are shareable
resources, each with a certain capacity defined as the maximal number of agents that may
share this resource. Each agent has preferences over the resources and is interested in
getting exactly one. The goal is to select a predetermined number K of resources and
to find an optimal allocation of these resources (see Section 2 for details). This provides a
unified framework for the two rules and reveals the connection of proportional representation
problem to other resource allocation problems. In particular, it closely resembles multi-unit
resource allocation with single-unit demand [40, Chapter 11] (see also the work of Chevaleyre
et al. [11] for a survey of the most fundamental issues in the multiagent resource allocation
theory) and resource allocation with sharable indivisible goods [2,11]. Below, we point out
other connections of the Monroe and Chamberlin–Courant rules to several other problems.
Facility Location Problems. In the facility location problem, there are n customers lo-
cated in some area and an authority, say a city council, that wants to establish a fixed
number k of facilities to serve those customers. Customers incur certain costs (say
transportation costs) of using the facilities. Further, setting up a facility costs as well
(and this cost may depend on the facility’s location). The problem is to find k loca-
tions for the facilities that would minimize the total (societal) cost. If these facilities
have infinite capacities and can serve any number of customers, then each customer
would use his/her most preferred (i.e., closest) facility and the problem is similar to
finding the Chamberlin–Courant assignment. If the capacities of the facilities are fi-
nite and equal, the problem looks like finding an assignment in the Monroe rule. An
essential difference between the two problems are the setup costs and the distance
metric. The parameterized complexity of the Facility Location Problem was investi-
gated in Fellows and Fornau [17]. The papers of Procaccia et al. [37] and of Betzler
et al. [7] contain a brief discussion of the connection between the Facility Location
Problem and the winner determination problem under the Chamberlin–Courant rule.
Group Activity Selection Problem. In the group activity selection problem [14] we
have a group of agents (say, conference attendees) and a set of activities (say, options
that they have for a free afternoon such as a bus city tour or wine tasting). The agents
express preferences regarding the activities and organisers try to allocate agents to ac-
tivities to maximise their total satisfaction. If there are m possible activities but only
k must be chosen by organisers, then we are in the Chamberline-Courant framework,
if all activities can take all agents, and in the Monroe framework, if all activities have
the same capacities. The difference is that those capacities may be different and also
that in the Group Activity Selection Problem we may allow expression of more com-
plicated preferences. For example, an agent may express the following preference “I
like wine-tasting best provided that at most 10 people participate in it, and otherwise
I prefer a bus city tour provided that at least 15 people participate, and otherwise
I prefer to not take part in any activity”. The Group Activity Selection Problem is
more general than the winner determination in the Monroe and Chamberline-Courant
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rules. Some hardness and easiness results for this problem were obtained in [14], but
the investigation of this problem has only started.
The above connections show that, indeed, the complexity of winner determination under
the Monroe and Chamberlin–Courant voting rules are interesting, can lead to progress in
several other directions, and may have impact on other applications of artificial intelligence.
2 Preliminaries
We first define basic notions such as preference orders and positional scoring rules. Then we
present our Resource Allocation Problem in full generality and discuss which restrictions
of it correspond to the winner determination problem for the Monroe and Chamberlin–
Courant voting rules. Finally, we briefly recall relevant notions regarding computational
complexity.
Preferences. For each n ∈ N, by [n] we mean {1, . . . , n}. We assume that there is a
set N = [n] of agents and a set A = {a1, . . . am} of alternatives. Each alternative a ∈ A
has the capacity capa ∈ N, which gives the total number of agents that can be assigned to
it. Further, each agent i has a preference order ≻i over A, i.e., a strict linear order of the
form aπ(1) ≻i aπ(2) ≻i · · · ≻i aπ(m) for some permutation π of [m]. For an alternative a, by
posi(a) we mean the position of a in the i’th agent’s preference order. For example, if a
is the most preferred alternative for i then posi(a) = 1, and if a is the least preferred one
then posi(a) = m. A collection V = (≻1, . . . ,≻n) of agents’ preference orders is called a
preference profile.
We will often include subsets of the alternatives in the descriptions of preference orders.
For example, if A is the set of alternatives and B is some nonempty strict subset of A, then
by B ≻ A −B we mean that for the preference order ≻ all alternatives in B are preferred
to those outside of B.
A positional scoring function (PSF) is a function αm : [m] → N. A PSF αm is an
increasing positional scoring function (IPSF) if for each i, j ∈ [m], if i < j then αm(i) <
αm(j). Analogously, a PSF αm is a decreasing positional scoring function (DPSF) if for
each i, j ∈ [m], if i < j then αm(i) > αm(j).
Intuitively, if βm is an IPSF then βm(i) can represent the dissatisfaction that an agent
suffers when assigned to an alternative that is ranked i’th in his or her preference order.
Thus, we assume that for each IPSF βm it holds that βm(1) = 0 (an agent is not dissatisfied
by her top alternative). Similarly, a DPSF γm measures an agent’s satisfaction and we
assume that for each DPSF γm it holds that γm(m) = 0 (an agent is completely not
satisfied being assigned his or her least desired alternative). Sometimes we write α instead
of αm, when it cannot lead to a confusion.
We will often speak of families α of IPSFs (DPSFs) of the form α = (αm)m∈N, where
αm is a PSF on [m], such that:
1. For a family of IPSFs it holds that αm+1(i) = αm(i) for all m ∈ N and i ∈ [m].
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2. For a family of DPSFs it holds that αm+1(i+ 1) = αm(i) for all m ∈ N and i ∈ [m].
In other words, we build our families of IPSFs (DPSFs) by appending (prepending) values
to functions with smaller domains. To simplify notation, we will refer to such families of
IPSFs (DPSFs) as normal IPSFs (normal DPSFs). We assume that each function αm from a
family can be computed in polynomial time with respect to m. Indeed, we are particularly
interested in the Borda families of IPSFs and DPSFs defined by αmB,inc(i) = i − 1 and
αmB,dec(i) = m− i, respectively.
Assignment functions. A K-assignment function is any function Φ: N → A, such that
‖Φ(N)‖ ≤ K (that is, it matches agents to at most K alternatives), and such that for every
alternative a ∈ A we have that ‖Φ−1(a)‖ ≤ capa (i.e., the number of agents assigned to a
does not exceed a’s capacity capa).
We will also consider partial assignment functions. A partial K-assignment function is
defined in the same way as a regular one, except that it may assign a null alternative, ⊥,
to some of the agents. It is convenient to think that for each agent i we have posi(⊥) = m.
In general, it might be the case that a partial K-assignment function cannot be extended
to a regular one. This may happen, for example, if the partial assignment function uses K
alternatives whose capacities sum to less than the total number of voters. However, in the
context of Chamberlin–Courant and Monroe rules it is always possible to extend a partial
K-assignment function to a regular one.
Given a normal IPSF (DPSF) α, we may consider the following three functions, each
assigning a positive integer to any assignment Φ:
ℓα1 (Φ) =
n∑
i=1
α(posi(Φ(i))),
ℓα∞(Φ) = max
n
i=1α(posi(Φ(i))),
ℓαmin(Φ) = min
n
i=1α(posi(Φ(i))).
These functions are built from individual dissatisfaction (satisfaction) functions, so that
they can measure the quality of the assignment for the whole society. In the utilitarian
framework the first one can be viewed as a total (societal) dissatisfaction function in the
IPSF case and a total (societal) satisfaction function in the DPSF case. The second and the
third can be used, respectively, as a total dissatisfaction and satisfaction functions for IPSF
and DPSF cases in the egalitarian framework. We will omit the word total if no confusion
may arise.
For each subset of the alternatives S ⊆ A such that ‖S‖ ≤ K, we denote as ΦSα the
partial K-assignment that assigns agents only to the alternatives from S and such that
ΦSα maximizes the utilitarian satisfaction ℓ
α
1 (Φ
S
α). (We introduce this notation only for the
utilitarian satisfaction-based setting because it is useful to express appropriate algorithms
for this case; for other settings we have hardness results only and this notation would not
be useful.)
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The Resource Allocation Problem. Let us now define the resource allocation problem
that forms the base of our study. This problem stipulates finding an optimal K-assignment
function, where the optimality is relative to one of the total dissatisfaction or satisfaction
functions that we have just introduced. The former is to be minimized and the latter is to
be maximized.
Definition 1. Let α be a normal IPSF. An instance of α-DU-Assignment problem (i.e., of
the disatisfaction-based utilitarian assignment problem) consists of a set of agents N = [n],
a set of alternatives A = {a1, . . . am}, a preference profile V of the agents, and a sequence
(capa1 , . . . , capam) of alternatives’ capacities. We ask for an assignment function Φ such
that: (1) ‖Φ(N)‖ ≤ K; (2) ‖Φ−1(a)‖ ≤ capa for all a ∈ A; and (3) ℓ
α
1 (Φ) is minimized.
Problem α-SU-Assignment (the satisfaction-based utilitarian assignment problem) is
defined identically except that α is a normal DPSF and condition (3) is replaced with
“(3′) ℓα1 (Φ) is maximal.” If we replace ℓ
α
1 with ℓ
α
∞ in α-DU-Assignment then we obtain
problem α-DE-Assignment, i.e., the dissatisfaction-based egalitarian variant. If we replace
ℓα1 with ℓ
α
min in α-SU-Assignment then we obtain problem α-SE-Assignment, i.e., the
satisfaction-based egalitarian variant.
Our four problems can be viewed as generalizations of the winner determination problem
for the Monroe [32] and Chamberlin–Courant [10] multiwinner voting systems (see the
introduction for their definitions). To model the Monroe system, it suffices to set the
capacity of each alternative to be ‖N‖
K
(for simplicity, throughout the paper we assume that
K divides ‖N‖1). We will refer to thus restricted variants of our problems as the Monroe
variants. To represent the Chamberlin–Courant system, we set alternatives’ capacities to
‖N‖. We will refer to the so-restricted variants of our problems as CC variants.
Computational Issues. For many normal IPSFs α and, in particular, for the Borda
IPSF, even the above-mentioned restricted versions of the Resource Allocation Problem,
namely, α-DU-Monroe, α-DE-Monroe, α-DU-CC, and α-DE-CC are NP-complete [7,
37] (the same holds for the satisfaction-based variants of the problems). Thus we seek
approximate solutions.
Definition 2. Let r be a real number such that r ≥ 1 (0 < r ≤ 1) and let α be a normal IPSF
(a normal DPSF). An algorithm is an r-approximation algorithm for α-DU-Assignment
problem (for α-SU-Assignment problem) if on each instance I it returns a feasible assign-
ment Φ such that ℓα1 (Φ) ≤ r ·OPT (such that ℓ
α
1 (Φ) ≥ r ·OPT), where OPT is the optimal
total dissatisfaction (satisfaction) ℓα1 (ΦOPT).
We define r-approximation algorithms for the egalitarian variants analogously. Lu and
Boutilier [25] gave a (1− 1
e
)-approximation algorithm for the SU-CC family of problems.
Throughout this paper, we will consider each of the Monroe and CC variants of the
problem and for each we will either prove inapproximability with respect to any constant r
1In general, this assumption is not as innocent as it may seem. Often dealing with cases there K does not
divide ‖N‖ requires additional insights and care. However, for our algorithms and results, the assumption
simiplifies notation and does not lead to obscuring any unexpected difficulties.
9
(under standard complexity-theoretic assumptions) or we will present an approximation al-
gorithm. In our inapproximability proofs, we will use the following two classic NP-complete
problems [19].
Definition 3. An instance I of Set-Cover consists of set U = [n] (called the ground set),
family F = {F1, F2, . . . , Fm} of subsets of U , and positive integer K. We ask if there exists
a set I ⊆ [m] such that ‖I‖ ≤ K and
⋃
i∈I Fi = U .
Definition 4. X3C is a variant of Set-Cover where ‖U‖ is divisible by 3, each member
of F has exactly three elements, and K = ‖U‖3 .
Set-Cover remains NP-complete even if we restrict each member of U to be contained
in at most two sets from F (it suffices to note that this restriction is satisfied by Vertex-
Cover, which is a special case of Set-Cover). X3C remains NP-complete even if we
additionally assume that n is divisible by 2 and each member of U appears in at most 3
sets from F [19].
We will also use results from the theory of parameterized complexity developed by
Downey and Fellows [15]. This theory allows to single out a particular parameter of the
problem, say k, and analyze its ‘contribution’ to the overall complexity of the problem. An
analogue of the class P here is the class FPT which is the class of problems that can be
solved in time f(k)nO(1), where n is the size of the input instance, and f is some computable
function (for a fixed k everything gets polynomial). Parameterized complexity theory also
operates with classes W[1] ⊆W[2] ⊆ · · · which are believed to form a hierarchy of classes of
hard problems (combined, they are analogous to the class NP). It holds that FPT ⊆W[1],
but it seems unlikely that FPT = W[1], let alone FPT = W[2]. We point the reader to the
books of Niedermeier [34] and Flum and Grohe [18] for detailed overviews of parametrized
complexity theory. Interestingly, while both Set-Cover and Vertex-Cover are NP-
complete, the former is W[2]-complete and the latter belongs to FPT (see, e.g., the book of
Niedermeier [34] for these now-standard results and their history).
3 Hardness of Approximation
We now present our inapproximability results for the Monroe and Chamberlin–Courant
rules. Specifically, we show that there are no constant-factor approximation algorithms for
the dissatisfaction-based variants of the rules (both utilitarian and egalitarian) and for the
satisfaction-based egalitarian ones.
Naturally, these inapproximability results carry over to more general settings. For exam-
ple, unless P = NP, there are no polynomial-time constant-factor approximation algorithms
for the general dissatisfaction-based Resource Allocation Problem. On the other hand, our
results do not preclude good satisfaction-based approximation algorithms for the utilitarian
case and, indeed, in Section 4 we provide such algorithms.
Theorem 1. For each normal IPSF α and each constant factor r > 1, there is no
polynomial-time r-approximation algorithm for α-DU-Monroe unless P = NP.
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b
mf 3 m+m′ −ml
Agent 1:
Agent 2:
Agent 3:
Agent 4:
Agent 5:
Agent 6:
Agent n:
The alternatives from the second group
nα(3)r
m+m′ = m+ n
2·α(3)·r
C−1 positions
mf + nα(3)r
Figure 1: The alignment of the positions in the preference orders of the agents. The positions
are numbered from the left to the right. The left wavy line shows the positions mf (·), each
no greater than 3. The right wavy line shows the positions ml(·), each higher than nr ·α(3).
The alternatives from A2 (positions of one such an alternative is illustrated with the circle)
are placed only between the peripheral wavy lines. Each alternative from A2 is placed on
the left from the middle wavy line exactly 2 times, thus each such alternative is placed on
the left from the right dashed line no more than 2 times (exactly two times at the figure).
Proof. Let us fix a normal IPSF α and let us assume, aiming at getting a contradiction,
that there is some constant r > 1 and a polynomial-time r-approximation algorithm A for
α-DU-Monroe.
Let I be an instance of X3C with ground set U = [n] and family F = {F1, F2, . . . , Fm}
of 3-element subsets of U . Without loss of generality, we assume that n is divisible by both
2 and 3 and that each member of U appears in at most 3 sets from F .
Using I, we build instance IM of α-DU-Monroe as follows. We set N = U (that is, the
elements of the ground set are the agents) and we set A = A1∪A2, where A1 = {a1, . . . , am}
is a set of alternatives corresponding to the sets from the family F and A2 is a set of
dummy alternatives of cardinality ‖A2‖ =
1
2n
2r · α(3), needed for the construction. We let
m′ = ‖A2‖ and rename the alternatives in A2 so that A2 = {b1, . . . , bm′}. We set K =
n
3 .
We build agents’ preference orders using the following algorithm. For each j ∈ N , set
Mf (j) = {ai | j ∈ Fi} and Ml = {ai | j 6∈ Fi}. Set mf (j) = ‖Mf (j)‖ and ml(j) = ‖Ml(j)‖.
As the frequency of the elements from U is bounded by 3, we have mf (j) ≤ 3. For each
agent j we set his or her preference order to be of the form Mf (j) ≻j A2 ≻j Ml(j), where
the alternatives in Mf (j) and Ml(j) are ranked in an arbitrary way and the alternatives
from A2 are placed at positions mf (j) + 1, . . . ,mf (j) +m
′ in the way described below (see
Figure 1 for a high-level illustration of the construction).
We place the alternatives from A2 in the preference orders of the agents in such a way
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that for each alternative bi ∈ A2 there are at most two agents that rank bi among their
nr·α(3) top alternatives. The following construction achieves this effect. If (i+j)mod n < 2,
then alternative bi is placed at one of the positions mf (j) + 1, . . . ,mf (j) + nr · α(3) in j’s
preference order. Otherwise, bi is placed at a position with index higher thanmf (j)+nr·α(3)
(and, thus, at a position higher than nr · α(3)). This construction can be implemented
because for each agent j there are exactly m′ · 2
n
= nr ·α(3) alternatives bi1 , bi2 , binα(3)r such
that (ik + j)mod n < 2.
Let Φ be an assignment computed by A on IM . We will show that ℓ
α
1 (Φ) ≤ n · α(3) · r
if and only if I is a yes-instance of X3C.
(⇐) If there exists a solution for I (i.e., an exact cover of U with n3 sets from F), then
we can easily show an assignment in which each agent j is assigned to an alternative from
the top mf (j) positions of his or her preference order (namely, one that assigns each agent
j to the alternative ai ∈ A1 that corresponds to the set Fi, from the exact cover of U , that
contains j). Thus, for the optimal assignment ΦOPT it holds that ℓ
α
1 (ΦOPT) ≤ α(3) · n. In
consequence, A must return an assignment with the total dissatisfaction at most nr · α(3).
(⇒) Let us now consider the opposite direction. We assume that A found an assignment
Φ such that ℓα1 (Φ) ≤ nr · α(3) and we will show that I is a yes-instance of X3C. Since we
require each alternative to be assigned to either 0 or 3 agents, if some alternative bi from
A2 were assigned to some 3 agents, at least one of them would rank bi at a position worse
than nr · α(3). This would mean that ℓα1 (Φ) ≥ nr · α(3) + 1. Analogously, no agent j
can be assigned to an alternative that is placed at one of the ml(j) bottom positions of
j’s preference order. Thus, only the alternatives in A1 have agents assigned to them and,
further, if agents x, y, z, are assigned to some ai ∈ A1, then it holds that Fi = {x, y, z}
(we will call each set Fi for which alternative ai is assigned to some agents x, y, z selected).
Since each agent is assigned to exactly one alternative, the selected sets are disjoint. Since
the number of selected sets is K = n3 , it must be the case that the selected sets form an
exact cover of U . Thus, I is a yes-instance of X3C.
One may wonder if hardness of approximation for α-DU-Monroe is not an artifact
of the strict requirements regarding the number of chosen candidates. It turns out that
unless P = NP, there is no r-s-approximation algorithm that finds an assignment with the
following properties: (1) the aggregated dissatisfaction ℓα1 (Φ) is at most r times higher than
the optimal one, (2) the number of alternatives to which agents are assigned is at most sK
and (3) each selected alternative (the alternative that has agents assigned), is assigned to
no more than s⌈ n
K
⌉ and no less than 1
s
⌈ n
K
⌉ agents. (The proof is similar to the one used for
Theorem 1.) Thus, in our further study we do not consider such relaxations of the problem.
Theorem 2. For each normal IPSF α and each constant r > 1, there is no polynomial-time
r-approximation algorithm for α-DE-Monroe unless P = NP.
Proof. The proof of Theorem 1 applies to this case as well. In fact, it even suffices to take
m′ = ‖A2‖ =
1
2nr · α(3).
Results analogous to Theorems 1 and 2 hold for the DU-CC family of problems as well.
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Theorem 3. For each normal IPSF α and each constant factor r > 1, there is no
polynomial-time r-approximation algorithm for α-DU-CC unless P = NP.
Proof. Let us fix a normal IPSF α. For the sake of contradiction, let us assume that there
is some constant r > 1, and a polynomial-time r-approximation algorithm A for α-DU-
CC. We will show that it is possible to use A to solve the NP-complete Vertex-Cover
problem.
Let I = (U,F ,K) be an instance of Vertex-Cover, where U = [n] is the ground set,
F = {F1, . . . , Fm} is a family of subsets of U (where each member of U belongs to exactly
two sets in F), and K is a positive integer.
Given I, we construct an instance ICC of α-DU-CC as follows. The set of agents
is N = U and the set of alternatives is A =
⋃m
j=1Aj, where each Aj contains exactly
α(2) · r · n (unique) alternatives. Intuitively, for each j ∈ [m], the alternatives in Aj
correspond to the set Fj . For each Aj , 1 ≤ j ≤ m, we pick one alternative, which we
denote aj. For each agent i ∈ N , we set i’s preference order as follows: Let Fj and Fk,
j < k, be the two sets that contain i. Agent i’s preference order is of the form aj ≻i ak ≻i
Ak − {ak} ≻i A − (Ak ∪ {aj , ak}) (a particular order of alternatives in the sets Ak − {ak}
and A− (Ak ∪ {aj , ak}) is irrelevant for the construction). We ask for an assignment of the
agents to at most K alternatives.
Let us consider a solution Φ returned by A on input ICC . We claim that ℓ
α
1 (Φ) ≤ nr·α(2)
if and only if I is a yes-instance of Vertex-Cover.
(⇐) If I is a yes-instance then, clearly, each agent i can be assigned to one of the top two
alternatives in his or her preference order (if there is a size-K cover, then this assignment
selects at most K candidates). Thus the total dissatisfaction of an optimal assignment is
at most n ·α(2). As a result, the solution Φ returned by A has total dissatisfaction at most
nr · α(2).
(⇒) If A returns an assignment with total dissatisfaction no greater than nr ·α(2), then,
by the construction of agents preference orders, we see that each agent i was assigned to
an alternative from a set Aj such that i ∈ Fj . Since the assignment can use at most K
alternatives, this directly implies that there is a size-K cover of U with sets from F .
Theorem 4. For each normal IPSF α and each constant factor r > 1, there is no
polynomial-time r-approximation algorithm for α-DE-CC unless P = NP.
Proof. The proof of Theorem 3 is applicable in this case as well. In fact, it even suffices to
take the m groups of alternatives, A1, . . . , Am, to contain α(2) · r alternatives each.
The above results show that approximating algorithms for finding the minimal dissat-
isfaction of agents is difficult. On the other hand, if we focus on agents’ total satisfaction
then constant-factor approximation exist in many cases (see, e.g., the work of Lu and
Boutilier [25] and the next section). Yet, if we focus on the satisfaction of the least satis-
fied voter, there are no efficient constant-factor approximation algorithms for the Monroe
and Chamberlin–Courant systems. (However, note that our result for the Monroe setting
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is more general than the result for the Chamberlin–Courant setting; the latter is for the
Borda DPSF only.)
Theorem 5. For each normal DPSF α (where each entry is polynomially bounded in
the number of alternatives) and each constant factor r, with 0 < r ≤ 1, there is no r-
approximation algorithm for α-SE-Monroe unless P = NP.
Proof. Let us fix a DPSF α = (αm)m∈N, where each entry α
m is polynomially bounded in
the number of alternatives m. For the sake of contradiction, let us assume that for some r,
0 < r ≤ 1, there is a polynomial-time r-approximation algorithm A for α-SE-Monroe. We
will show that the existence of this algorithm implies that X3C is solvable in polynomial
time.
Let I be an X3C instance with ground set U = {1, 2, . . . , n} and collection F =
{F1, . . . , Fm} of subsets of U . Each set in F has cardinality three. Further, without loss
of generality, we can assume that n is divisible by three and that each i ∈ U appears in
at most three sets from F . Given I, we form an instance IM of α-SE-Monroe as follows.
Let n′ = 3 · (αm+1(1) · ⌈1−r
r
⌉+ 3). The set N of agents is partitioned into two subsets, N1
and N2. N1 contains n agents (intuitively, corresponding to the elements of the ground set
U) and N2 contains n
′ agents (used to enforce certain properties of the solution). The set
of alternatives A is partitioned into two subsets, A1 and A2. We set A1 = {a1, . . . , am}
(members of A1 correspond to the sets in F), and we set A2 = {b1, . . . , bm′}, wherem
′ = n
′
3 .
For each j, 1 ≤ j ≤ n, we set Mf (j) = {ai | j ∈ Fi}. For each j, 1 ≤ j ≤ n, we set the
preference order of the j’th agent in N1 to be of the form
Mf (j) ≻ A2 ≻ A1 −Mf (j).
Note that by our assumptions, ‖Mf (j)‖ ≤ 3. For each j, 1 ≤ j ≤ n
′, we set the preference
order of the j’th agent in N2 to be of the form
b⌈ j3⌉
≻ A2 − {b⌈ j3⌉
} ≻ A1.
Note that each agent in N2 ranks the alternatives from A1 in positions m
′ +1, . . . ,m′ +m.
Finally, we set the number of candidates that can be selected to be K = n+n
′
3 .
Now, consider the solution Φ returned by A on IM . We will show that ℓ
αm+m
′
∞ (Φ) ≤
rαm+m
′
(3) if and only if I is a yes-instance of X3C.
(⇐) If there exists an exact set cover of U with sets from F , then it is easy to construct
a solution for IM where the satisfaction of each agent is greater or equal to r · αm+m
′
(3).
Let I ⊆ {1, . . . ,m} be a set such that
⋃
i∈I Fi = U and ‖I‖ =
n
3 . We assign each agent
j from N1 to the alternative ai such that (a) i ∈ I and (b) j ∈ Fi, and we assign each
agent from N2 to his or her most preferred alternative. Thus, Algorithm A has to return
an assignment with the minimal satisfaction greater or equal to r · αm+m
′
(3).
(⇒) For the other direction, we first show that r ·αm+m
′
(3) ≥ αm+m
′
(m′). Since DPSFs
are strictly decreasing, it holds that:
r · αm+m
′
(3) ≥ r · (αm+m
′
(m′) +m′ − 3). (1)
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Then, by the definition of DPSFs, it holds that:
αm+m
′
(m′) = αm+1(1). (2)
Using the fact thatm′ = (αm+1(1)·⌈1−r
r
⌉+3) and using (2), we can transform inequality (1)
to obtain the following:
r · αm+m
′
(3) ≥ r · (αm+m
′
(m′) +m′ − 3)
= r ·
(
αm+m
′
(m′) + (αm+1(1) ·
⌈
1− r
r
⌉
+ 3)− 3
)
≥ r · αm+m
′
(m′) + (1− r) · αm+1(1)
= r · αm+m
′
(m′) + (1− r) · αm+m
′
(m′) = αm+m
′
(m′).
This means that if the minimal satisfaction of an agent is at least r · αm+m
′
(3), then no
agent was assigned to an alternative that he or she ranked beyond position m′. If some
agent j from N1 were assigned to an alternative from A2, then, by the pigeonhole principle,
some agent from N2 would be assigned to an alternative from A1. However, each agent
in N2 ranks the alternatives from A1 beyond position m
′ and thus such an assignment is
impossible. In consequence, it must be that each agent in j was assigned to an alternative
that corresponds to a set Fi in F that contains j. Such an assignment directly leads to a
solution for I.
Let us now move on to the case of SE-CC family of problems. Unfortunately, in this
case our inapproximability argument holds for the case of Borda DPSF only (though we
believe that it can be adapted to other DPSFs as well). Further, in our previous theorems
we were showing that existence of a respective constant-factor approximation algorithm
implies that NP collapses to P. In the following theorem we will show a seemingly weaker
collapse of W[2] to FPT.
To prove hardness of approximation for αB,dec-SE-CC, we first prove the following
simple lemma.
Lemma 6. Let K, p, l be three positive integers and let X be a set of cardinality lpK.
There exists a family S = {S1, . . . , S(lKK )
} of pK-element subsets of X such that for each
K-element subset B of X, there is a set Si ∈ S such that B ⊆ Si.
Proof. Set X ′ = [lK] and let Y ′ be a family of all K-element subsets of X ′. Replace each
element i of X ′ with p new elements (at the same time replacing i with the same p elements
within each set in Y ′ that contains i). As a result we obtain two new sets, X and Y , that
satisfy the statement of the theorem (up to the renaming of the elements).
Theorem 7. Let αmB,dec be the Borda DPSF (α
m
B,dec(i) = m− i). For each constant factor
r, 0 < r ≤ 1, there is no r-approximation algorithm for αmB,dec-SE-CC unless FPT = W[2].
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Proof. For the sake of contradiction, let us assume that there is some constant r, 0 < r ≤ 1,
and a polynomial-time r-approximation algorithm A for αmB,dec-SE-CC. We will show that
the existence of this algorithm implies that Set-Cover is fixed-parameter tractable for the
parameter K (since Set-Cover is known to be W[2]-complete for this parameter, this will
imply FPT = W[2]).
Let I be an instance of Set-Cover with ground set U = [n] and family F =
{F1, F2, . . . , Fm} of subsets of U . Given I, we build an instance ICC of α
m
B,dec-SE-CC
as follows. The set of agents N consists of n subsets of agents, N1, . . . , Nn, where each
group Ni contains exactly n
′ =
(⌈ 2r ⌉K
K
)
agents. Intuitively, for each i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, the agents
in the set Ni correspond to the element i in U . The set of alternatives A is partitioned
into two subsets, A1 and A2, such that: (1) A1 = {a1, . . . , am} is a set of alternatives cor-
responding to the sets from the family F , and (2) A2, ‖A2‖ =
⌈
2
r
⌉ ⌈m(1+r)
K
⌉
K, is a set of
dummy alternatives needed for our construction. We set m′ = ‖A‖ = m+ ‖A2‖.
Before we describe the preference orders of the agents in N , we form a family R =
{r1, . . . , rn′} of preference orders over A2 that satisfies the following condition: For each
K-element subset B of A2, there exists rj in R such that all members of B are ranked
among the bottom
⌈
m(1+r)
K
⌉
K positions in rj . By Lemma 6, such a construction is possible
(it suffices to take l =
⌈
2
r
⌉
and p =
⌈
m(1+r)
K
⌉
); further, the proof of the lemma provides an
algorithmic way to construct R.
We form the preference orders of the agents as follows. For each i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, set
Mf (i) = {at | i ∈ Ft}. For each i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, and each j, 1 ≤ j ≤ n
′, the j’th agent from Ni
has preference order of the form:
Mf (i) ≻ rj ≻ A1 −Mf (i)
(we pick any arbitrary, polynomial-time computable order of candidates within Mf (i) and
Ml(i)).
Let Φ be an assignment computed byA on IM . We will show that ℓ
αm
′
B,dec
∞ (Φ) ≥ r·(m′−m)
if and only if I is a yes-instance of Set-Cover.
(⇐) If there exists a solution for I (i.e., a cover of U with K sets from F), then we
can easily show an assignment where each agent is assigned to an alternative that he or she
ranks among the top m positions (namely, for each j, 1 ≤ j ≤ n, we assign all the agents
from the set Nj to the alternative ai ∈ A1 such that j ∈ Fi and Fi belongs to the alleged
K-element cover of U). Under this assignment, the least satisfied agent’s satisfaction is at
least m′ −m and, thus, A has to return an assignment Φ where ℓ
αm
′
B,dec
∞ (Φ) ≥ r · (m′ −m).
(⇒) Let us now consider the opposite direction. We assume that A found an assignment
Φ such that ℓ
αmB,dec
∞ (Φ) ≥ r · (m′ − m) and we will show that I is a yes-instance of Set-
Cover. We claim that for each i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, at least one agent j in Ni were assigned to an
alternative from A1. If all the agents in Ni were assigned to alternatives from A2, then, by
the construction of R, at least one of them would have been assigned to an alternative that he
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or she ranks at a position greater than ‖A2‖−
⌈
m(1+r)
K
⌉
K =
⌈
2
r
⌉ ⌈m(1+r)
K
⌉
K−
⌈
m(1+r)
K
⌉
K.
For x =
⌈
m(1+r)
K
⌉
K we have:
⌈
2
r
⌉
x− x ≥ m′ −m′r +mr
(we skip the straightforward calculation) and, thus, this agent would have been assigned
to an alternative that he or she ranks at a position greater than m′ − m′r + mr. As a
consequence, this agent’s satisfaction would be lower than (m′ −m)r. Similarly, no agent
from Ni can be assigned to an alternative from Ml(i). Thus, for each i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n,
there exists at least one agent j ∈ Ni that is assigned to an alternative from Mf (i). In
consequence, the covering subfamily of F consists simply of those sets Fk, for which some
agent is assigned to alternative ak ∈ A1.
The presented construction gives the exact algorithm for Set-Cover problem running
in time f(K)(n + m)O(1), where f(K) is polynomial in
(⌈ 2r ⌉
K
)
. The existence of such an
algorithm means that Set-Cover is in FPT. On the other hand, we know that Set-
Cover is W[2]-complete, and thus if A existed then FPT = W[2] would hold.
4 Algorithms for the Utilitarian, Satisfaction-Based Cases
We now turn to approximation algorithms for the Monroe and Chamberlin–Courant mul-
tiwinner voting rules in the satisfaction-based framework. Indeed, if one focuses on agents’
total satisfaction then it is possible to obtain high-quality approximation results. In par-
ticular, we show the first nontrivial (randomized) approximation algorithm for αB,dec-SU-
Monroe. We show that for each ǫ > 0 we can provide a randomized polynomial-time
algorithm that achieves 0.715 − ǫ approximation ratio; the algorithm usually gives even
better approximation guarantees. For the case of arbitrarily selected DPSF we show a
(1− e−1)-approximation algorithm. Finally, we show the first polynomial-time approxima-
tion scheme (PTAS) for αB,dec-SU-CC. These results stand in sharp contrast to those from
the previous section, where we have shown that approximation is hard for essentially all
remaining variants of the problem.
The core difficulty in solving α-Monroe/CC-Assignment problems lays in selecting
the alternatives that should be assigned to the agents. Given a preference profile and a
set S of up to K alternatives, using a standard network-flow argument, it is easy to find a
(possibly partial) optimal assignment ΦSα of the agents to the alternatives from S.
Proposition 8 (Implicit in the paper of Betzler et al. [7]). Let α be a normal DPSF,
N be a set of agents, A be a set of alternatives (togehter with their capacities; perhaps
represented implicitly as for the case of the Monroe and Chamberlin–Courant rules), V be a
preference profile of N over A, and S a K-element subset of A (where K divides ‖N‖). Then
there is a polynomial-time algorithm that computes a (possibly partial) optimal assignment
ΦSα of the agents to the alternatives from S.
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Notation: Φ← a map defining a partial assignment, iteratively built by the algorithm.
Φ← ← the set of agents for which the assignment is already defined.
Φ→ ← the set of alternatives already used in the assignment.
if K ≤ 2 then
compute the optimal solution using an algorithm of Betzler et al. [7] and return.
Φ = {}
for i← 1 to K do
score← {}
bests← {}
foreach ai ∈ A \ Φ→ do
agents← sort N \ Φ← so that if agent j precedes agent k then posj(ai) ≤ posk(ai)
bests[ai]← chose first ⌈
N
K
⌉ elements from agents
score[ai]←
∑
j∈bests[ai ]
(m− posj(ai))
abest ← argmaxa∈A\Φ→score[a]
foreach j ∈ bests[abest] do
Φ[j]← abest
Figure 2: The pseudocode for Algorithm A.
Note that for the case of the Chamberlin–Courant rule the algorithm from the above
proposition can be greatly simplified: To each voter we assign the candidate that he or she
ranks highest among those from S. For the case of Monroe, unfortunately, we need the
expensive network-flow-based approach. Nonetheless, Proposition 8 allows us to focus on
the issue of selecting the winning alternatives and not on the issue of matching them to the
agents.
Below we describe our algorithms for αB,dec-SU-Monroe and for αB,dec-SU-CC. For-
mally speaking, every approximation algorithm for αB,dec-SU-Monroe also gives feasible
results for αB,dec-SU-CC. However, some of our algorithms are particularly well-suited for
both problems and some are tailored to only one of them. Thus, for each algorithm we
clearly indicate if it is meant only for the case of Monroe, only for the case of CC, or if it
naturally works for both systems.
4.1 Algorithm A (Monroe)
Perhaps the most natural approach to solve αB,dec-SU-Monroe is to build a solution
iteratively: In each step we pick some not-yet-assigned alternative ai (using some criterion)
and assign it to those ⌈N
K
⌉ agents that (a) are not assigned to any other alternative yet,
and (b) whose satisfaction of being matched with ai is maximal. It turns out that this idea,
implemented formally as Algorithm A (see pseudo code in Figure 2), works very well in
many cases. We provide a lower bound on the total satisfaction it guarantees in the next
lemma. We remind the reader that the so-called k’th harmonic number Hk =
∑k
i=1
1
i
has
asymptotics Hk = Θ(log k).
Lemma 9. Algorithm A is a polynomial-time (1− K−12(m−1) −
HK
K
)-approximation algorithm
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for αB,dec-SU-Monroe.
Proof. Our algorithm explicitly computes an optimal solution when K ≤ 2 so we assume
that K ≥ 3. Let us consider the situation in the algorithm after the i’th iteration of the
outer loop (we have i = 0 if no iteration has been executed yet). So far, the algorithm has
picked i alternatives and assigned them to i n
K
agents (recall that for simplicity we assume
that K divides n evenly). Hence, each agent has ⌈m−i
K−i⌉ unassigned alternatives among his
or her i + ⌈m−i
K−i⌉ top-ranked alternatives. By pigeonhole principle, this means that there
is an unassigned alternative aℓ who is ranked among top i + ⌈
m−i
K−i⌉ positions by at least
n
K
agents. To see this, note that there are (n − i n
K
)⌈m−i
K−i⌉ slots for unassigned alternatives
among the top i+ ⌈m−i
K−i⌉ positions in the preference orders of unassigned agents, and that
there are m − i unassigned alternatives. As a result, there must be an alternative aℓ for
whom the number of agents that rank him or her among the top i+ ⌈m−i
K−i⌉ positions is at
least:
1
m− i
(
(n− i
n
K
)
⌈
m− i
K − i
⌉)
≥
n
m− i
(
K − i
K
)(
m− i
K − i
)
=
n
K
.
In consequence, the ⌈ n
K
⌉ agents assigned in the next step of the algorithm will have the
total satisfaction at least ⌈ n
K
⌉ · (m− i− ⌈m−i
K−i⌉). Thus, summing over the K iterations, the
total satisfaction guaranteed by the assignment Φ computed by Algorithm Ais at least the
following value: (to derive the fifth line from the fourth one we note thatK(HK−1)−HK ≥ 0
when K ≥ 3):
ℓαb1 (Φ) ≥
K−1∑
i=0
n
K
·
(
m− i− ⌈
m− i
K − i
⌉
)
≥
K−1∑
i=0
n
K
·
(
m− i−
m− i
K − i
− 1
)
=
K∑
i=1
n
K
·
(
m− i−
m− 1
K − i+ 1
+
i− 2
K − i+ 1
)
=
n
K
(
K(2m−K − 1)
2
− (m− 1)HK +K(HK − 1)−HK
)
≥
n
K
(
K(2m−K − 1)
2
− (m− 1)HK
)
≥ (m− 1)n
(
1−
K − 1
2(m− 1)
−
HK
K
)
If each agent were assigned to his or her top alternative, the total satisfaction would be
equal to (m− 1)n. Thus we get the following bound:
ℓ
αB,dec
1 (Φ)
OPT
≤ 1−
K − 1
2(m− 1)
−
HK
K
.
This completes the proof.
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Note that in the above proof we measure the quality of our assignment against, a
perhaps-impossible, perfect solution, where each agent is assigned to his or her top al-
ternative. This means that for relatively large m and K, and small K
m
ratio, the algorithm
can achieve a close-to-ideal solution irrespective of the voters’ preference orders. We believe
that this is an argument in favor of using Monroe’s system in multiwinner elections. On
the flip side, to obtain a better approximation ratio, we would have to use a more involved
bound on the quality of the optimal solution. To see that this is the case, form an instance
I of αB,dec-SU-Monroe with n agents and m alternatives, where all the agents have the
same preference order, and where we seek to elect K candidates (and where K divides n).
It is easy to see that each solution that assigns the K universally top-ranked alternatives to
the agents is optimal. Thus the total dissatisfaction of the agents in the optimal solution
is:
n
K
((m− 1) + · · ·+ (m−K)) =
n
K
(
K(2m−K − 1)
2
)
= n(m− 1)
(
1−
K − 1
2(m− 1)
)
.
By taking large enough m and K (even for a fixed value of m
K
), the fraction 1 − K−12(m−1)
can be arbitrarily close to the approximation ratio of our algorithm (the reasoning here is
somewhat in the spirit of the idea of identifying maximally robust elections, as studied by
Shiryaev, Yu, and Elkind [39]).
For small values of K, it is possible that the HK
K
part of our approximation ratio would
dominate the K−12(m−1) part. In such cases we can use the result of Betzler et al. [7], who
showed that for each fixed constant K, αB,dec-SU-Monroe can be solved in polynomial
time. Thus, for the finite number of cases where HK
K
is too large, we can solve the problem
optimally using their algorithm. In consequence, the quality of the solution produced by
Algorithm A most strongly depends on the ratio K−12(m−1) . In most cases we can expect it to
be small (for example, in Polish parliamentary elections K = 460 and m ≈ 6000; in this
case the greedy algorithm’s approximation ratio is about 0.96).
Our algorithm has one more great advantage: Since it focuses on the top parts of
voters’ preference orders, it can achieve very good results even if the voters submit so-called
truncated ballots (that is, if they rank some of their top alternatives only). Below we present
the formal analysis of the algorithm’s approximation ratio for this case. Unfortunately, we
did not obtain a closed form formula and, instead, we present the guaranteed approximation
ratio as a sum, in Proposition 10 below. We also present the relation between the fraction
of the top alternatives ranked by each of the voters and the approximation ratio for few
values of m and K in Figure 3.
Proposition 10. Let P be the number of top positions in the agents’ preference orders that
are known by the algorithm. In this case Algorithm A is a polynomial-time r-approximation
algorithm for αB,dec-SU-Monroe, where:
r =
K−1∑
i=0
1
n(m− 1)
max(r(i), 0)
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and
r(i) =


n
K
(m− i− m−i
K−i) if
(
i+ m−i
K−i
)
≤ P ,
n
K
(K−i)(m−i)
4 if
(
i+ m−i
K−i
)
> P and (2P −m) ≥ i ≥ (K − 2),
n
K
(m−P )(K−i)(P−i)
m−i otherwise.
Proof. We use the same approach as in the proof of Lemma 9, except that we adjust
our estimates of voters’ satisfaction. Consider a situation after some i’th iteration of the
algorithm’s outer loop (i = 0 if we are before the first iteration). If i + m−i
K−i ≤ P , then we
can use the same lower bound for the satisfaction of the agents assigned in the (i + 1)’th
iteration as in the proof of Lemma 9. That is, the agents assigned in the (i+1)’th iteration
will have satisfaction at least r1(i) =
n
K
· (m− i− m−i
K−i).
For the case where i + m−i
K−i > P , the bound from Lemma 9 does not hold, but we can
use a similar approach to find a different one. Let Px ≤ P be some positive integer. We
are interested in the number x of not-yet assigned agents who rank some not-yet-selected
alternative among their top Px positions (after the i’th iteration). Similarly as in the proof
of Lemma 9, using the pigeonhole principle we note that:
x ≥
1
m− i
(
n− i
n
K
)
(Px − i) =
n
K
·
(K − i)(Px − i)
m− i
.
Thus, the satisfaction of the agents assigned in the (i+ 1)’th iteration is at least:
min
(
x,
n
K
)
(m− Px) =
n
K
· (m− Px)min
(
(K − i)(Px − i)
m− i
, 1
)
. (3)
The case (K−i)(Px−i)
m−i ≥ 1 (or, equivalently, i+
m−i
K−i ≤ Px) implies that i+
m−i
K−i ≤ P and for
this case we lower-bound agents’ satisfaction by r1(i). For the case where
(K−i)(Px−i)
m−i ≤ 1,
i.e. where i+ m−i
K−i ≥ Px, equation (3) simplifies to:
n
K
· (m− Px) ·
(K − i)(Px − i)
m− i
. (4)
We use this estimate for the satisfaction of the agents assigned in the (i + 1)’th iteration
for the cases where (a) i+ m−i
K−i ≥
m+i
2 and (b)
m+i
2 ≤ P (or, equivalently, (2P −m) ≥ i ≥
(K − 2)). In this case we estimate (4) as follows:
n
K
· (m− Px) ·
(K − i)(Px − i)
m− i
≥
n
K
· (m−
m+ i
2
) ·
(K − i)(m+i2 − i)
m− i
=
n
K
·
(K − i)(m− i)2
4(m− i)
=
n
K
·
(K − i)(m− i)
4
.
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For the remaining cases, we set Px = P and (4) becomes:
n
K
·
(m− P )(K − i)(P − i)
m− i
.
Naturally, we replace our estimates by 0 whenever they become negative.
To complete the proof, it suffice to, as in the proof of Lemma 9, note that (m − 1)n is
an upper bound on the satisfaction achieved by the optimal solution.
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Figure 3: The relation between the percentage of the known positions and the approximation
ratio of Algorithm A for αB,dec-SU-Monroe.
For example, for the case of Polish parliamentary elections (K = 460 and m = 6000),
to achieve 90% of voters’ optimal satisfaction, each voter would have to rank about 8.7%
of the candidates.
Our results show that for most settings there is very little reason to ask the agents to
rank all the alternatives. Using Proposition 10, election designers can estimate how many
alternatives the agents should rank to obtain a particular level of satisfaction and, since
computing preference orders can be expensive for the agents, this way can save a large
amount of effort.
4.2 Algorithm B (Monroe)
There are simple ways in which we can improve the quality of the assignments produced
by Algorithm A. For example, our Algorithm B first runs Algorithm A and then, using
Proposition 8, optimally reassigns the alternatives to the voters. As shown in Section 5, this
very simple trick turns out to noticeably improve the results of the algorithm in practice
(and, of course, the theoretical approximation guarantees of Algorithm A carry over to
Algorithm B).
4.3 Algorithm C (Monroe, CC)
Algorithm C is a further heuristic improvement over Algorithm B. This time the idea is
that instead of keeping only one partial function Φ that is iteratively extended up to the full
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Notation: We use the same notation as in Algorithm A;
Par ← a list of partial representation functions
Par = []
Par.push({})
for i← 1 to K do
newPar = []
for Φ ∈ Par do
bests← {}
foreach ai ∈ A \ Φ→ do
agents← sort N \Φ← (agent j precedes agent k implies that posj(ai) ≤ posk(ai))
bests[ai]← chose first ⌈
N
K
⌉ elements of agents
Φ′ ← Φ
foreach j ∈ bests[ai] do
Φ′[j]← ai
newPar.push(Φ′)
sort newPar according to descending order of the total satisfaction of the assigned
agents
Par← chose first d elements of newPar
for Φ ∈ Par do
Φ← compute the optimal representative function using an algorithm of Betzler et al. [7]
for the set of winners Φ→
return the best representative function from Par
Figure 4: The pseudocode for Algorithm C.
assignment, we keep a list of up to d partial assignment functions, where d is a parameter of
the algorithm. At each iteration, for each assignment function Φ among the d stored ones
and for each alternative a that does not yet have agents assigned to by this Φ, we compute
an optimal extension of this Φ that assigns agents to a. As a result we obtain possibly more
than d (partial) assignment functions. For the next iteration we keep those d of them that
give highest satisfaction.
We provide pseudocode for Algorithm C in Figure 4. If we take d = 1, we obtain
Algorithm B. If we also disregard the last two lines prior to returning the solution, we
obtain Algorithm A.
Algorithm C can also be adapted for the Chamberlin–Courant rule. The only difference
concerns creating the assignment functions: we replace the contents of the first foreach loop
with the following code:
foreach ai ∈ A \ Φ→ do
Φ′ ← Φ
foreach j ∈ N do
if agent j prefers ai to Φ
′(j) then
Φ′(j)← ai
newPar.push(Φ′)
Note that, for the case of the Chamberlin–Courant rule, Algorithm C can also be seen as a
generalization of Algorithm GM that we will discuss later in Section 4.5.
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4.4 Algorithm R (Monroe, CC)
Algorithms A, B and C achieve very high approximation ratios for the cases where K is
small relative to m. For the remaining cases, where K and m are comparable, we can use
a sampling-based randomized algorithm (denoted as Algorithm R) described below. We
focus on the case of Monroe and we will briefly mention the case of CC at the end.
The idea of this algorithm is to randomly pick K alternatives and match them optimally
to the agents, using Proposition 8. Naturally, such an algorithm might be very unlucky and
pick K alternatives that all of the agents rank low. Yet, if K is comparable to m then it is
likely that such a random sample would include a large chunk of some optimal solution. In
the lemma below, we asses the expected satisfaction obtained with a single sampling step
(relative to the satisfaction given by the optimal solution) and the probability that a single
sampling step gives satisfaction close to the expected one. Naturally, in practice one should
try several sampling steps and pick the one with the highest satisfaction.
Lemma 11. A single sampling step of the randomized algorithm for αB,dec-SU-Monroe
achieves expected approximation ratio of 12(1 +
K
m
− K
2
m2−m
+ K
3
m3−m2
). Let pǫ denote the
probability that the relative deviation between the obtained total satisfaction and the expected
total satisfaction is higher than ǫ. Then for K ≥ 8 we have pǫ ≤ exp
(
−Kǫ
2
128
)
.
Proof. Let N = [n] be the set of agents, A = {a1, . . . , am} be the set of alternatives, and V
be the preference profile of the agents. Let us fix some optimal solution Φopt and let Aopt be
the set of alternatives assigned to the agents in this solution. For each ai ∈ Aopt, we write
sat(ai) to denote the total satisfaction of the agents assigned to ai in Φopt. Naturally, we
have
∑
a∈Aopt
sat(a) = OPT. In a single sampling step, we choose uniformly at random a
K-element subset B of A. Then, we form a solution ΦB by matching the alternatives in B
optimally to the agents (via Proposition 8). We write Kopt to denote the random variable
equal to ‖Aopt ∩ B‖, the number of sampled alternatives that belong to Aopt. We define
pi = Pr(Kopt = i). For each j ∈ {1, . . . ,K}, we write Xj to denote the random variable
equal to the total satisfaction of the agents assigned to the j’th alternative from the sample.
We claim that for each i, 0 ≤ i ≤ K, it holds that:
E

 K∑
j=1
Xj
∣∣∣∣∣Kopt = i

 ≥ i
K
OPT+
m− i− 1
2
·
(
n− i
n
K
)
.
Why is this so? Given a sample B that contains i members of Aopt, our algorithm’s solution
is at least as good as a solution that matches the alternatives from B∩Aopt in the same way
as Φopt, and the alternatives from B −Aopt in a random manner. Since Kopt = i and each
aj ∈ Aopt has equal probability of being in the sample, it is easy to see that the expected
value of
∑
aj∈B∩Aopt
sat(aj) is
i
K
OPT. After we allocate the agents from B ∩Aopt, each of
the remaining, unassigned agents has m − i positions in his or her preference order where
he ranks the agents from A − Aopt. For each unassigned agents, the average score value
associated with these positions is at least m−i−12 (this is so, because in the worst case the
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agent could rank the alternatives from B ∩Aopt in the top i positions). There are (n− i
n
K
)
such not yet assigned agents and so the expected total satisfaction from assigning them
randomly to the alternatives is m−i−12 · (n − i
n
K
). This proves our bound on the expected
satisfaction of a solution yielded by optimally matching a random sample of K alternatives.
Since OPT is upper bounded by (m − 1)n (consider a possibly-nonexistent solution
where every agent is assigned to his or her top preference), we get that:
E

 K∑
j=1
Xj |Kopt = i

 ≥ i
K
OPT+
m− i− 1
2(m− 1)
·
(
1−
i
K
)
OPT.
We can compute the unconditional expected satisfaction of ΦB as follows:
E

 K∑
j=1
Xj

 = K∑
i=0
pi E

 K∑
j=1
Xj |Kopt = i


≥
K∑
i=0
pi
(
i
K
OPT+
m− i− 1
2(m− 1)
·
(
1−
i
K
)
OPT
)
.
Since
∑K
i=1 pi ·i is the expected number of the alternatives in Aopt, we have that
∑K
i=1 pi ·i =
K2
m
(one can think of summing the expected values of K indicator random variables; one for
each element of Aopt, taking the value 1 if a given alternative is selected and taking the value
0 otherwise). Further, from the generalized mean inequality we obtain
∑K
i=1 pi ·i
2 ≥
(
K2
m
)2
.
In consequence, through routine calculation, we get that:
E

 K∑
j=1
Xj

 ≥ (K
m
OPT+
m2 −K2 −m
2m(m− 1)
·
(
1−
K
m
)
OPT
)
=
OPT
2
(
1 +
K
m
−
K2
m2 −m
+
K3
m3 −m2
)
.
It remains to assess the probability that the total satisfaction obtained through ΦB is
close to its expected value. Since Xj ∈ 〈0,
(m−1)n
K
〉, from Hoeffding’s inequality we get:
pǫ = Pr


∣∣∣∣∣∣
K∑
j=1
Xj − E(
K∑
j=1
Xj)
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≥ ǫE(
K∑
j=1
Xj)


≤ exp
(
−
2ǫ2(E(
∑K
j=1Xj))
2
K( (m−1)n
K
)2
)
= exp
(
−
Kǫ2(E(
∑K
j=1Xj))
2
((m− 1)n)2
)
We note that since K
m
− K
2
m2−m
≥ 0, our previous calculations show that E(
∑K
j=1Xj) ≥
OPT
2 .
Further, for K ≥ 8, Lemma 9 (and the fact that in its proof we upper-bound OPT to be
(m− 1)n) gives that OPT ≥ mn8 . Thus pǫ ≤ exp
(
−Kǫ
2
128
)
. This completes the proof.
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In the next theorem we will see that to have a high chance of obtaining a high quality
assignment, we need to repeat the sampling step many times. Thus, for practical purposes,
by Algorithm R we mean an algorithm that repreats the sampling process a given number of
times (this parameter is given as input) and returns the best solution found (the assignment
is created using Proposition 8).
The threshold for K
m
, where the sampling step is (in expectation) better than the greedy
algorithm is about 0.57. Thus, by combining the two algorithms, we can guarantee an
expected approximation ratio of 0.715 − ǫ, for each fixed constant ǫ. The pseudo-code of
the combination of the two algorithms (Algorithm AR) is presented in Figure 5.
Theorem 12. For each fixed ǫ, Algorithm AR provides a (0.715− ǫ)-approximate solution
for the problem αB,dec-SU-Monroe with probability λ in time polynomial with respect to
the input instance size and − log(1− λ).
Proof. Let ǫ be a fixed constant. We are given an instance I of αB,dec-SU-Monroe. If
m ≤ 1 + 2
ǫ
, we solve I using a brute-force algorithm (note that in this case the number
of alternatives is at most a fixed constant). Similarly, if HK
K
≥ ǫ2 then we use the exact
algorithm of Betzler et al. [7] for a fixed value of K (note that in this case K is no greater
than a certain fixed constant). We do the same if K ≤ 8.
On the other hand, if neither of the above conditions hold, we try both Algorithm A
and a number of runs of the sampling-based algorithm. It is easy to check through routine
calculation that if HK
K
≤ ǫ2 and m > 1 +
2
ǫ
then Algorithm A achieves approximation ratio
no worse than (1 − K2m − ǫ). We run the sampling-based algorithm
−512 log(1−λ)
Kǫ2
times.
The probability that a single run fails to find a solution with approximation ratio at least
1
2(1 +
K
m
− K
2
m2−m
+ K
3
m3−m2
) − ǫ2 is p ǫ2 ≤ exp
(
− Kǫ
2
4·128
)
. Thus, the probability that at least
one run will find a solution with at least this approximation ratio is at least:
1− p
−512 log(1−λ)
Kǫ2
ǫ
2
= 1− exp
(
−
Kǫ2
4 · 128
·
−512 log(1− λ)
Kǫ2
)
= λ.
Since m ≤ 1 + 2
ǫ
, by routine calculation we see that the sampling-based algorithm with
probability λ finds a solution with approximation ratio at least 12 (1 +
K
m
− K
2
m2
+ K
3
m3
) − ǫ.
By solving the equality:
1
2
(
1 +
K
m
−
K2
m2
+
K3
m3
)
= 1−
K
2m
we can find the value of K
m
for which the two algorithms give the same approximation
ratio. By substituting x = K
m
we get equality 1 + x − x2 + x3 = 2 − x. One can calculate
that this equality has a single solution within 〈0, 1〉 and that this solution is x ≈ 0.57.
For this x both algorithms guarantee approximation ratio of 0.715 − ǫ. For x < 0.57 the
deterministic algorithm guarantees a better approximation ratio and for x > 0.57, the
randomized algorithm does better.
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Notation: We use the same notation as in Algorithm 2; w(·) denotes Lambert’s W-Function.
Parameters: λ ← required probability of achieving the approximation ratio equal 0.715− ǫ
if HK
K
≥ ǫ2 or K ≤ 8 then
compute the optimal solution using an algorithm of Betzler et al. [7] and return.
if m ≤ 1 + 2
ǫ
then
compute the optimal solution using a simple brute force algorithm and return.
Φ1 ← solution returned by Algorithm A
Φ2 ← run the sampling-based algorithm
−512 log(1−λ)
Kǫ2
times; select the assignment of the best
quality
return the better assignment among Φ1 and Φ2
Figure 5: Algorithm AR—combination of Algorithms A and R.
Let us now consider the case of CC. It is just as natural to try a sampling-based ap-
proach for solving αB,dec-SU-CC, as we did for the Monroe variant. Indeed, as recently (and
independently) observed by Oren [35], this leads to a randomized algorithm with expected
approximation ratio of (1− 1
K+1)(1 +
1
m
). However, since we will later see an effective, de-
terministic, polynomial-time approximation scheme for αB,dec-SU-CC, there is little reason
to explore the sampling based approach.
4.5 Algorithm GM (Monroe, CC)
Algorithm GM (greedy marginal improvement) was introduced by Lu and Boutilier for the
case of the Chamberlin–Courant rule. Here we generalize it to apply to Monroe’s rule as
well, and we show that it is a 1− 1
e
approximation algorithm for α-SU-Monroe. We point
out that this approximation result for Monroe rule applies to all non-decreasing PSFs α.
For the Monroe rule, the algorithm can be viewed as an extension of Algorithm B.
The algorithm proceeds as follows. We start with an emtpy set S. Then we execute K
iterations. In each iteration we find an alternative a that is not assigned to agents yet, and
that maximizes the value Φ
S∪{a}
α . (A certain disadvantage of this algorithm for the case of
Monroe is that it requires a large number of computations of ΦSα; since in Monroe’s rule each
alternative can be assigned at most n
K
agents in the partial assignment ΦSα, computation of
ΦSα is a slow process based on min-cost/max-flow algorithm.) We provide the pseudocode
for Algorithm GM in Figure 6.
Theorem 13. For any non-decreasing positional scoring function α Algorithm GM is an
(1− 1
e
)-approximation algorithm for α-SU-Monroe.
Proof. The proof follows by applying the powerful result of Nemhauser et al. [33], which says
that greedy algorithms achieve 1− 1
e
approximation ratio when used to optimize nondecreas-
ing submodular functions (we explain these notions formally below). The main challenge
in the proof is to define a function that, on one hand, satisfies the conditions of Nemhauser
et al.’s result, and, on the other, models solutions for α-SU-Monroe.
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Notation: ΦSα—the partial assignement that assigns a single alternative to at most ⌈
n
K
⌉
agents, that assigns to the agents only the alternatives from S, and that
maximizes the utilitarian satisfaction ℓα1 (Φ
S
α).
S ← ∅
for i← 1 to K do
a← argmaxa∈A\Sℓ
α
1 (Φ
S∪{a}
α )
S ← S ∪ {a}
return ΦSα
Figure 6: Pseudocode for Algorithm GM.
Let A be a set of alternatives, N = [n] be a set of agents with preferences over A, α be
an ‖A‖-candidate DPSF, and K ≤ ‖A‖ be the number of representatives that we want to
elect. We consider function z : 2A → N defined, for each set S, S ⊆ A and ‖S‖ ≤ K, as
z(S) = ℓα1 (Φ
S
α). Clearly, z(S) is nondecreasing (that is, for each two sets A and B, if A ⊆ B
and ‖B‖ ≤ K then z(A) ≤ z(B). Since argmaxS⊂A,‖S‖=Kz(S) is the set of winners under
α-Monroe and since Algorithm GM builds the solution iteratively by greedily extending
initially empty set S so that each iteration increases the value of z(S) maximally, if z were
submodular then by the results of Nemhauser et al. [33] we would get that Algorithm GM
is a (1− 1
e
)-approximation algorithm. Thus, our goal is to show that z is submodular.
Formally, our goal is to show that for each two sets S and T , S ⊂ T , and each alternative
a /∈ T it holds that z(S ∪ {a}) − z(S) ≥ z(T ∪ {a}) − z(T ) (this is the formal definition of
submodularity). First, we introduce a notion that generalizes the notion of a partial set of
winners S. Let s : A→ N denote a function that assigns a capacity to each alternative (i.e.,
s gives a bound on the number of agents that a given alternative can represent). Intuitively,
each set S, S ⊆ A, corresponds to the capacity function that assigns ⌈n
k
⌉ to each alternative
a ∈ S and 0 to each a /∈ S. Given a capacity function s, we define a partial solution Φsα
to be one that maximizes the total satisfaction of the agents and that satisfies the new
capacity constraints: ∀a∈S‖(Φ
s
α)
−1(a)‖ ≤ s(a). To simplify notation, we write s ∪ {a} to
denote the function such that (s ∪ {a})(a) = s(a) + 1 and ∀a′∈S\{a}(s ∪ {a})(a
′) = s(a′).
(Analogously, we interpret s \ {a} as subtracting one from the capacity for a; provided it
is nonzero.) Also, by s ≤ t we mean that ∀a∈As(a) ≤ t(a). We extend our function z to
allow us to consider a subset of the agents only. For each subset N ′ of the agents and each
capacity function s, we define zN ′(s) to be the satisfaction of the agents in N
′ obtained
under Φsα. We will now prove a stronger variant of submodularity for our extended z. That
is, we will show that for each two capacity functions s and t it holds that:
s ≤ t⇒ zN (s ∪ {a}) − zN (s) ≥ zN (t ∪ {a})− zN (t). (5)
Our proof is by induction on N . Clearly, Equation (5) holds for N ′ = ∅. Now, assuming
that Equation (5) holds for every N ′ ⊂ N we will prove its correctness for N . Let i denote
an agent such that Φ
t∪{a}
α (i) = a (if there is no such agent then clearly the equation holds).
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Let as = Φ
s
α(i) and at = Φ
t
α(i). We have:
zN (t ∪ {a})− zN (t) = α(posi(a)) + zN\{i}(t)− α(posi(at))− zN\{i}(t \ {at}).
We also have:
zN (s ∪ {a})− zN (s) ≥ α(posi(a)) + zN\{i}(s)− α(posi(as))− zN\{i}(s \ {as}).
Since Φtα describes an optimal representation function under the capacity restrictions t, we
have that:
α(posi(at)) + zN\{i}(t \ at) ≥ α(posi(as)) + zN\{i}(t \ {as}).
Finally, from the inductive hypothesis for N ′ = N \ {i} we have:
zN\{i}(s)− zN\{i}(s \ {as}) ≥ zN\{i}(t)− zN\{i}(t \ {as}).
By combining these inequalities we get:
zN (s ∪ {a}) − zN (s) ≥ α(posi(a)) + zN\{i}(s)− (α(posi(as)) + zN\{i}(s \ {as}))
≥ α(posi(a))− α(posi(as)) + zN\{i}(t)− zN\{i}(t \ {as})
≥ α(posi(a)) + zN\{i}(t)− α(posi(at))− zN\{i}(t \ {at})
= zN (t ∪ {a}) − zN (t).
This completes the proof.
Formally speaking, Algorithm GM is never worse than Algorithm A. For Borda satis-
faction function, it inherits the approximation guarantees from Algorithm A, and for other
cases Theorem 13 guarantees approximation ratio 1− 1
e
(we do not know of any guarantees
for Algorithm A for these cases). The comparison with Algorithms B and C is not nearly as
easy. Algorithm GM is still likely better than them for satisfaction functions significantly
different from Borda’s, but for the Borda case our experiments show that Algorithm GM
is much slower than Algorithms B and C and obtains almost the same or slightly worse
results (see Section 5).
4.6 Algorithm P (CC)
The idea of our algorithm (presented in Figure 7) is to compute a certain value x and to
greedily compute an assignment that (approximately) maximizes the number of agents as-
signed to one of their top-x alternatives.2 If after this process some agent has no alternative
assigned, we assign him or her to his or her most preferred alternative from those already
picked. Somewhat surprisingly, it turns out that this greedy strategy achieves high-quality
results. (Recall that for nonnegative real numbers, Lambert’s W-function, w(x), is defined
to be the solution of the equation x = w(x)ew(x).)
2This is very similar to the so-called MaxCover problem. Skowron and Faliszewski [42] have discussed
the connection of MaxCover to the winner determination problem under the Chamberlin–Courant voting
system (for approval-based satisfaction functions) and provided a number of FPT approximation schemes
for it.
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Notation: We use the same notation as in Algorithm C;
num posx(a)← ‖{i ∈ [n] \ Φ
← : posi(a) ≤ x}‖ (the number of not-yet assigned
agents that rank alternative a in one of their first x positions)
Φ = {}
x = ⌈mw(K)
K
⌉
for i← 1 to K do
ai ← argmaxa∈A\Φ→num posx(a)
foreach j ∈ [n] \ Φ← do
if posj(ai) < x then
Φ[j]← ai
foreach j ∈ A \ Φ← do
a← such server from Φ→ that ∀a′∈Φ→posj(a) ≤ posj(a′)
Φ[j]← a
Figure 7: The algorithm for αB,dec-SU-CC (Algorithm P).
Lemma 14. Algorithm P is a polynomial-time (1 − 2w(K)
K
)-approximation algorithm for
αB,dec-SU-CC.
Proof. Let x = mw(K)
K
. We will first give an inductive proof that, for each i, 0 ≤ i ≤ K,
after the i’th iteration of the outer loop at most n(1− w(K)
K
)i agents are unassigned. Based
on this observation, we will derive the approximation ratio of our algorithm.
For i = 0, the inductive hypothesis holds because n(1 − w(K)
K
)0 = n. For each i, let
ni denote the number of unassigned agents after the i’th iteration. Thus, after the i’th
iteration there are ni unassigned agents, each with x unassigned alternatives among his or
her top-x ranked alternatives. As a result, at least one unassigned alternative is present in
at least nix
m−i of top-x positions of unassigned agents. This means that after the (i + 1)’st
iteration the number of unassigned agents is:
ni+1 ≤ ni −
nix
m− i
≤ ni
(
1−
x
m
)
= ni
(
1−
w(K)
K
)
.
If for a given i the inductive hypothesis holds, that is, if ni ≤ n
(
1− w(K)
K
)i
, then:
ni+1 ≤ n(1−
w(K)
K
)i(1−
w(K)
K
) = n
(
1−
w(K)
K
)i+1
.
Thus the hypothesis holds and, as a result, we have that:
nk ≤ n
(
1−
w(K)
K
)K
≤ n
(
1
e
)w(K)
=
nw(K)
K
.
Let Φ be the assignment computed by our algorithm. To compare it against the optimal
solution, it suffices to observe that the optimal solution has the value of satisfaction of at
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most OPT ≤ (m− 1)n, that each agent selected during the first K steps has satisfaction at
least m− x = m− mw(K)
K
, and that the agents not assigned within the first K steps have
satisfaction no worse than 0. Thus it holds that:
ℓ
αB,dec
1 (Φ)
OPT
≥
(n− nw(K)
K
)(m− mw(K)
K
)
(m− 1)n
≥
(
1−
w(K)
K
)(
1−
w(K)
K
)
≥ 1−
2w(K)
K
.
This completes the proof.
Since for each ǫ > 0 there is a value Kǫ such that for each K > Kǫ it holds that
2w(K)
K
< ǫ, and αB,dec-SU-CC problem can be solved optimally in polynomial time for each
fixed constantK(see the work of Betzler et al. [7]), there is a polynomial-time approximation
scheme (PTAS) for αB,dec-SU-CC (i.e., a family of algorithms such that for each fixed r,
0 < r < 1, there is a polynomial-time r-approximation algorithm for αB,dec-SU-CC in the
family; note that in PTASes we measure the running time by considering r to be a fixed
constant).
Theorem 15. There is a PTAS for αB,dec-SU-CC.
The idea used in Algorithm P can also be used to address a generalized SE-CC problem.
We can consider the following relaxation of SE-CC: Instead of requiring that each agent’s
satisfaction is lower-bounded by some value, we ask that the satisfactions of a significant
majority of the agents are lower-bounded by a given value. More formally, for a given
constant δ, we introduce an additional quality metric:
ℓδ,αmin(Φ) = maxN ′⊆N : ||N||−||N
′||
||N||
≤δ
mini∈N ′α(posi(Φ(i))).
For a given 0 < δ < 1, by putting x = −m ln(δ)
K
, we get (1 + ln(δ)
K
)-approximation algorithm
for the ℓδ,αmin(Φ) metric.
Finally, we show that Algorithm P performs very well even if the voters cast truncated
ballots. Proposition 16 gives the relation between the number of positions used by the
algorithm and the approximation ratio. In Figure 8 we show this relation for some values
of the parameters m and K.
Proposition 16. Let Q be the number of top positions in the agents’ preference orders
that are known by the algorithm (Q ≤ mw(K)
K
). Algorithm P that uses x = Q instead of
x = ⌈mw(K)
K
⌉ is a polynomial-time
(
m−Q
m−1 (1− e
−QK
m )
)
-approximation algorithm for αB,dec-
SU-CC.
Proof. Let ni denote the number of the agents not-yet-assigned until the (i+1)-th iteration
of the algorithm. Using the same reasoning as in Lemma 14 we show that ni ≤ n(1−
Q
m
)i.
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Figure 8: The relation between the percentage of the known positions and the approximation
ratio of Algorithm P for αB,dec-SU-CC.
As before, our proof proceeds by induction on i. It is evident that the hypothesis is correct
for i = 0. Now, assuming that ni ≤ n(1−
Q
m
)i, we assess ni+1 as follows:
ni+1 ≤ ni −
niQ
m− i
≤ ni
(
1−
Q
m
)
≤ n
(
1−
Q
m
)i+1
.
This proves the hypothesis. Thus, we can bound nK :
nK ≤ n
(
1−
Q
m
)K
≤ n
(
1
e
)QK
m
.
This means that the satisfaction of the assignment Φ returned by our algorithm is at least:
ℓ
αB,dec
1 (Φ) ≥ (n− nK)(m−Q) ≥ n(m−Q)(1− e
−QK
m ).
In effect, it holds that:
ℓ
αB,dec
1 (Φ)
OPT
≥
n(m−Q)(1− e−
QK
m )
n(m− 1)
≥
m−Q
m− 1
(
1− e−
QK
m
)
.
This completes the proof.
For example, for Polish parliamentary elections (K = 460, m = 6000), it suffices that
each voter ranks only 0.5% of his or her top alternatives (that is, about 30 alternatives)
for the algorithm to find a solution with guaranteed satisfaction at least 90% of the one
(possibly infeasible) where every voter is assigned to his or her top alternative.
4.7 ILP Formulation (Monroe, CC)
To experimentally measure the quality of our approximation algorithms, we compare the
results against optimal solutions that we obtain using integer linear programs (ILPs) that
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solve the Monroe and Chamberlin–Courant winner determination problem. An ILP for the
Monroe rule was provided by Potthoff and Brams [36], Lu and Boutilier [25] adapted it
also for the Chamberlin–Courant rule with arbitraty PSF α. For the sake of completeness,
below we recall the ILP whose optimal solutions correspond to α-SU-Monroe winner sets for
the given election (we also indicate which constraints to drop to obtain an ILP for finding
α-SU-CC winner sets):
1. For each i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, and each j, 1 ≤ j ≤ m we have a 0/1 variable aij indicating
whether alternative aj represents agent i. For each j, 1 ≤ j ≤ m, we have a 0/1
variable xj indicating whether alternative aj is included in the set of winners.
2. Our goal is to maximize the value
∑n
i=1 α(posi(aj))aij subject to the following con-
straints:
(a) For each i and j, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, 1 ≤ j ≤ m, 0 ≤ aij ≤ xj (alaternative aj can
represent agent i only if aj belongs to the set of winners)
(b) For each i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n,
∑
1≤j≤m aij = 1 (every agent is represented by exactly one
alternative).
(c) For each j, 1 ≤ j ≤ m, xj⌊
n
K
⌋ ≤
∑
1≤i≤n aij ≤ xj⌈
n
K
⌉ (each alternative either
does not represent anyone or represents between ⌊ n
K
⌋ and ⌈ n
K
⌉ agents; if we
remove these constraints then we obtain an ILP for the Chamberlin-Courant
rule).
(d)
∑n
j=1 xj ≤ K (there are exactly K winners
3).
We used the GLPK 4.47 package (GNU Linear Programming Kit, version 4.47) to solve
these ILPs, whenever it was possible to do so in reasonable time.
5 Empirical Evaluation of the Algorithms
In this section we present the results of empirical evaluation of algorithms from Section 4.
In the experiments we evaluated versions of the randomized algorithms that use exactly 100
sampling steps. In all cases but one, we have used Borda PSF to measure voter satisfaction.
In one case, with six candidates, we have used DPSF defined through vector (3, 3, 3, 2, 1, 0)
(we made this choice due to the nature of the data set used; see discussion later).
We have conducted four sets of experiments. First, we have tested all our algorithms on
relatively small elections (up to 10 candidates, up to 100 agents). In this case we were able
to compare the solutions provided by our algorithms with the optimal ones. (To obtain the
optimal solutions, we were using the ILP formulations and the GLPK’s ILP solver.) Thus
we report the quality of our algorithms as the average of fractions C/Copt, where C is the
satisfaction obtained by a respective algorithm and Copt is the satisfaction in the optimal
3For the Monroe framework inequality here is equivalent to equality. We use the inequality so that
deleting constraints from item (2c) leads to an ILP for the Chamberlin-Courant rule.
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solution. For each algorithm and data set, we also report the average fraction C/Cideal,
where Cideal is the satisfaction that the voters would have obtained if each of them were
matched to his or her most preferred alternative. In our further experiments, where we
considered larger elections, we were not able to compute optimal solutions, but fraction
C/Cideal gives a lower bound for C/Copt. We report this value for small elections so that
we can see an example of the relation between C/Copt and C/Cideal and so that we can
compare the results for small elections with the results for the larger ones. Further, for
the case of Borda PSF the C/Cideal fraction has a very natural interpretation: If its value
for a given solution is v, then, on the average, in this solution each voter is matched to an
alternative that he or she prefers to (m− 1)v alternatives.
In our second set of experiments, we have run our algorithms on large elections (thou-
sands of agents, hundreds of alternatives), coming either from the NetFlix data set (see
below) or generated by us using one of our models. Here we reported the average fraction
C/Cideal only. We have analyzed the quality of the solutions as a function of the number of
agents, the number of candidates, and the relative number of winners (fraction K/m). (This
last set of results is particularly interesting because in addition to measuring the quality
of our algorithms, it allows one to asses the size of a committee one should seek if a given
average satisfaction of agents is to be obtained).
In the third set of experiments, we have investigated the effect of submitting trun-
cated ballots (i.e., preference orders where only some of the top alternatives are ranked).
Specifically, we focused on the relation between the fraction of ranked alternatives and the
approximation ratio of the algorithms. We run our experiments on relatively large instances
describing agents’ preferences; thus, here as in the previous set of experiments, we used Net-
Flix data set and the synthetic data sets. We report the quality of the algorithms as the
ratio C/Cideal.
In the fourth set of experiments we have measured running times of our algorithms and
of the ILP solver. Even though all our algorithms (except for the ILP based ones) are
polynomial-time, in practice some of them are too slow to be useful.
5.1 Experimental Data
For the evaluation of the algorithms we have considered both real-life preference-aggregation
data and synthetic data, generated according to a number of election models. The experit-
ments reported in this paper predate the work of Mattei and Walsh [29] on gathering a large
collection of data sets with preference data, but we mention that the conference version of
this paper contributed several data sets to their collection.
5.1.1 Real-Life Data
We have used real-life data regarding people’s preference on sushi types, movies, college
courses, and competitors’ performance in figure-skating competitions. One of the major
problems regarding real-life preference data is that either people express preferences over a
very limited set of alternatives, or their preference orders are partial. To address the latter
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issue, for each such data set we complemented the partial orders to be total orders using
the technique of Kamishima [23]. (The idea is to complete each preference order based on
those reported preference orders that appear to be similar.)
Some of our data sets contain a single profile, whereas the others contain multiple
profiles. When preparing data for a given number m of candidates and a given number
n of voters from a given data set, we used the following method: We first uniformly at
random chose a profile within the data set, and then we randomly selected n voters and m
candidates. We used preference orders of these n voters restricted to these m candidates.
Sushi Preferneces. We used the set of preferences regarding sushi types collected by
Kamishima [23].4 Kamishima has collected two sets of preferences, which we call S1 and
S2. Data set S1 contains complete rankings of 10 alternatives collected from 5000 voters.
S2 contains partial rankings provided by 5000 voters over a set of 100 alternatives (each
vote ranks 10 alternatives). We used Kamishima [23] technique to obtain total rankings.
Movie Preferences. Following Mattei et al. [28], we have used the NetFlix data set5 of
movie preferences (we call it Mv). NetFlix data set contains ratings collected from about
480 thousand distinct users regarding 18 thousand movies. The users rated movies by giving
them a score between 1 (bad) and 5 (good). The set contains about 100 million ratings. We
have generated 50 profiles using the following method: For each profile we have randomly
selected 300 movies, picked 10000 users that ranked the highest number of the selected
movies, and for each user we have extended his or her ratings to a complete preference
order using the method of Kamishima [23].
Course Preferences. Each year the students at the AGH University choose courses that
they would like to attend. The students are offered a choice of six courses of which they
have to attend three. Thus the students are asked to give an unordered set of their three
top-preferred courses and a ranking of the remaining ones (in case too many students select
a course, those with the highest GPA are enrolled and the remaining ones are moved to their
less-preferred courses). In this data set, which we call Cr, we have 120 voters (students)
and 6 alternatives (courses). However, due to the nature of the data, instead of using Borda
count PSF as the satisfaction measure, we have used the vector (3, 3, 3, 2, 1, 0). Currently
this data set is available as part of PrefLib [29].
Figure Skating. This data set, which we call Sk, contains preferences of the judges
over the performances in a figure-skating competitions. The data set contains 48 profiles,
each describing a single competition. Each profile contains preference orders of 9 judges over
about 20 participants. The competitions include European skating championships, Olympic
Games, World Junior, and World Championships, all from 19986. (Note that while in figure
skating judges provide numerical scores, this data set is preprocessed to contain preference
orders.)
4The sushi data set is available under the following url: http://www.kamishima.net/sushi/
5http://www.netflixprize.com/
6This data set is available under the following url: http://rangevoting.org/SkateData1998.txt.
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5.1.2 Synthetic Data
For our tests, we have also used profiles generated using three well-known distributions of
preference orders.
Impartial Culture. Under the impartial culture model of preferences (which we denote
IC), for a given set A of alternatives, each voter’s preference order is drawn uniformly at
random from the set of all possible total orders over A. While not very realistic, profiles gen-
erated using impartial culture model are a standard testbed of election-related algorithms.
Polya-Eggenberger Urn Model. Following McCabe-Dansted and Slinko [31] and
Walsh [44], we have used the Polya-Eggenberger urn model [4] (which we denote Ur).
In this model we generate votes as follows. We have a set A of m alternatives and an urn
that initially contains all m! preference orders over A. To generate a vote, we simply ran-
domly pick one from the urn (this is our generated vote), and then—to simulate correlation
between voters—we return a copies of this vote to the urn. When generating an election
with m candidates using the urn model, we have set the parameter a so that a
m! = 0.05
(Both McCabe-Dansted and Slinko [31] and Walsh [44] call this parameter b; we mention
that those authors use much higher values of b but we felt that too high a value of b leads
to a much too strong correlation between votes).
Generalized Mallow’s Model. We refer to this data set as Ml. Let ≻ and ≻′ be two
preference orders over some alternative set A. Kendal-Tau distance between ≻ and ≻′,
denoted dK(≻,≻
′), is defined as the number of pairs of candidates x, y ∈ A such that either
x ≻ y ∧ y ≻′ x or y ≻ x ∧ x ≻′ y.
Under Mallow’s distribution of preferences [27] we are given two parameters: A center
preference order ≻ and a number φ between 0 and 1. The model says that the probability of
generating preference order ≻′ is proportional to the value φdK (≻,≻
′). To generate preference
orders following Mallow’s distribution, we use the algorithm given by Lu and Boutilier [26].
In our experiments, we have used a mixture of Mallow’s models. Let A be a set of
alternatives and let ℓ be a positive integer. This mixture model is parametrized by three
vectors, Λ = (λ1, . . . , λℓ) (where each λi is between 0 and 1, and
∑ℓ
i=1 λ1 = 1), Φ =
(φ1, . . . , φℓ) (where each φi is a number between 0 and 1), and Π = (≻1, . . . ,≻ℓ) (where
each ≻i is a preference order over A). To generate a vote, we pick a random integer i,
1 ≤ i ≤ ℓ (each i is chosen with probability λi), and then generate the vote using Mallow’s
model with parameters (≻i, φi).
For our experiments, we have used a = 5, and we have generated vectors Λ, Φ, and Π
uniformly at random.
5.2 Evaluation on Small Instances
We now present the results of our experiments on small elections. For each data set, we
generated elections with the number of agents n = 100 (n = 9 for data set Sk because there
are only 9 voters there) and with the number of alternatives m = 10 (m = 6 for data set Cr
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Monroe CC
A B C GM R C GM P R
S1 0.94 0.99 ≈ 1.0 0.99 0.99 1.0 ≈ 1.0 0.99 0.99
S2 0.95 0.99 1.0 ≈ 1.0 0.99 1.0 ≈ 1.0 0.98 0.99
Mv 0.96 ≈ 1.0 1.0 ≈ 1.0 0.98 1.0 ≈ 1.0 0.96 ≈ 1.0
Cr 0.98 0.99 1.0 ≈ 1.0 0.99 1.0 ≈ 1.0 1.0 ≈ 1.0
Sk 0.99 ≈ 1.0 1.0 ≈ 1.0 0.94 1.0 ≈ 1.0 0.85 0.99
IC 0.94 0.99 ≈ 1.0 0.99 0.99 1.0 ≈ 1.0 0.99 0.99
Ml 0.94 0.99 1.0 0.99 0.99 1.0 ≈ 1.0 0.99 0.99
Ur 0.95 0.99 ≈ 1.0 0.99 0.99 1.0 0.99 0.97 0.99
Table 1: The average quality of the algorithms compared with the optimal solution (C/Copt)
for the small instances of data and for K = 3 (K = 2 for Cr); m = 10 (m = 6 for Cr);
n = 100 (n = 9 for Sk).
Monroe CC
A B C GM R C GM P R
S1 0.95 ≈ 1.0 1.0 0.99 0.99 1.0 ≈ 1.0 0.97 0.99
S2 0.94 0.99 ≈ 1.0 0.99 0.99 1.0 ≈ 1.0 0.98 ≈ 1.0
Mv 0.95 0.99 1.0 ≈ 1.0 0.98 1.0 ≈ 1.0 0.97 ≈ 1.0
Cr 0.96 ≈ 1.0 1.0 ≈ 1.0 0.99 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.00
Sk 0.99 ≈ 1.0 1.0 ≈ 1.0 0.88 1.0 1.0 0.91 ≈ 1.0
IC 0.95 0.99 ≈ 1.0 0.99 0.99 1.0 ≈ 1.0 0.99 0.99
Ml 0.95 0.99 ≈ 1.0 0.99 0.99 1.0 ≈ 1.0 0.98 0.99
Ur 0.96 0.99 ≈ 1.0 0.99 ≈ 1.0 1.0 ≈ 1.0 0.96 0.99
Table 2: The average quality of the algorithms compared with the optimal solution (C/Copt)
for the small instances of data and for K = 6 (K = 4 for Cr); m = 10 (m = 6 for Cr);
n = 100 (n = 9 for Sk).
because there are only 6 alternatives there) using the method described in Section 5.1.1 for
the real-life data sets, and in the natural obvious way for synthetic data. For each algorithm
and for each data set we ran 500 experiments on different instances for K = 3 (for the Cr
data set we used K = 2) and 500 experiments for K = 6 (for Cr we set K = 4). For
Algorithm C (both for Monroe and for CC) we set the parameter d, describing the number
of assignment functions computed in parallel, to 15. The results (average fractions C/Copt
and C/Cideal) for K = 3 are given in Tables 1 and 3; the results for K = 6 are given in
Tables 2 and 4 (they are almost identical as for K = 3). For each experiment in this section
we also computed the standard deviation; it was always on the order of 0.01. The results
lead to the following conclusions:
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Monroe CC
A B C GM R C GM P R
S1 0.85 0.89 0.9 0.89 0.89 0.92 0.89 0.91 0.92
S2 0.85 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.93 0.9 0.91 0.92
Mv 0.88 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.91 0.97 0.92 0.93 0.97
Cr 0.94 0.97 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97
Sk 0.96 0.96 0.97 0.97 0.91 1.0 0.97 0.82 0.99
IC 0.8 0.84 0.85 0.84 0.84 0.85 0.83 0.84 0.85
Ml 0.83 0.88 0.88 0.9 0.88 0.92 0.90 0.89 0.94
Ur 0.8 0.85 0.86 0.87 0.85 0.9 0.87 0.87 0.89
Table 3: The average quality of the algorithms compared with the simple lower bound
(C/Cideal) for the small instances of data and for K = 3 (K = 2 for Cr); m = 10 (m = 6
for Cr); n = 100 (n = 9 for Sk).
Monroe CC
A B C GM R C GM P R
S1 0.91 0.96 0.96 0.95 0.95 0.98 0.98 0.96 0.98
S2 0.88 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.98 0.98 0.96 0.98
Mv 0.85 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.88 0.99 0.99 0.97 0.99
Cr 0.95 0.98 0.99 0.99 0.98 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
Sk 0.91 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.81 1.0 1.0 0.91 ≈ 1.0
IC 0.91 0.95 0.95 0.94 0.95 0.96 0.96 0.95 0.95
Ml 0.89 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.93 0.97 0.98 0.95 0.98
Ur 0.91 0.95 0.95 0.94 0.95 0.98 0.98 0.94 0.97
Table 4: The average quality of the algorithms compared with the simple lower bound
(C/Cideal) for the small instances of data and for K = 6 (K = 4 for Cr); m = 10 (m = 6
for Cr); n = 100 (n = 9 for Sk).
1. For the case of Monroe, already Algorithm A obtains very good results, but nonethe-
less Algorithms B and C improve noticeably upon Algorithm A. In particular, Algo-
rithm C (for d = 15) obtains the highest satisfaction on all data sets and in almost
all cases was able to find an optimal solution.
2. Both for Monroe and for CC, Algorithm R gives slightly worse solutions than Algo-
rithm C.
3. The results do not seem to depend on the data sets used in the experiments (the only
exception is Algorithm R for the Monroe system on data set Sk; however Sk has only
9 voters so it can be viewed as a border case).
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5.3 Evaluation on Larger Instances
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Figure 9: The relation between the number of alternatives m and the quality of the algo-
rithms C/Cideal for the Monroe system; K/m = 0.3; n = 1000.
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Figure 10: The relation between the number of alternatives m and the quality of the
algorithms C/Cideal for the Chamberlin–Courant system; K/m = 0.3; n = 1000.
For experiments on larger instances we needed data sets with at least n = 10000 agents.
Thus we used the NetFlix data set and synthetic data. (Additionally, we run the subset
of experiments (for n ≤ 5000) also for the S2 data set.) For the Monroe rule we present
results for Algorithm A, Algorithm C, and Algorithm R, and for the Chamberlin–Courant
rule we present results for Algorithm C and Algorithm R. We limit the set of algorithms
for the sake of the clarity of the presentation. For Monroe we chose Algorithm A because
it is the simplest and the fastest one, Algorithm C because it is the best generalization of
Algorithm A that we were able to run in reasonable time, and Algorithm R to compare a
randomized algorithm to deterministic ones. For the Chamberlin–Courant rule we chose
Algorithm C because it is, intuitively, the best one, and we chose Algorithm R for the same
reason as in the case of Monroe.
First, for each data set and for each algorithm we fixed the value of m and K and
for each n ranging from 1000 to 10000 with the step of 1000 we run 50 experiments. We
repeated this procedure for 4 different combinations of m and K: (m = 10, K = 3),
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Figure 11: The relation between the ratio K/m and the quality of the algorithms C/Cideal
for the Monroe system; m = 100; n = 1000.
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Figure 12: The relation between the ratio K/m and the quality of the algorithms C/Cideal
for the Chamberlin–Courant system; m = 100; n = 1000.
(m = 10, K = 6), (m = 100, K = 30) and (m = 100, K = 60). We measured the statistical
correlation between the number of voters and the quality of the algorithms C/Cideal. The
ANOVA test in most cases showed that there is no such correlation. The only exception
was S2 data set, for which we obtained an almost negligible correlation. For example, for
(m = 10,K = 3) Algorithm C under data set S2 for Monroe’s system for n = 5000 gave
C/Cideal = 0.88, while for n = 100 (in the previous section) we got C/Cideal = 0.89. Thus
we conclude that in practice the number of agents has almost no influence on the quality
of the results provided by our algorithms.
Next, we fixed the number of voters n = 1000 and the ratio K/m = 0.3, and for each m
ranging from 30 to 300 with the step of 30 (naturally, as m changed, so did K to maintain
the ratio K/m), we run 50 experiments. We repeated this procedure for K/m = 0.6. The
relation between m and C/Cideal for Mv and Ur, under both the Monroe rule and the
Chamberlin–Courant rule, is given in Figures 9 and 10 (the results for K/m = 0.6 look
similar).
Finally, we fixed n = 1000 and m = 100, and for each K/m ranging from 0.1 and 0.5
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with the step of 0.1 we run 50 experiments. The relation between the ratio K/m and the
quality C/Cideal is presented in Figures 11 and 12.
For the case of Chamberlin–Courant system, increasing the size of the committee to
be elected improves overall agents’ satisfaction. Indeed, since there are no constraints
on the number of agents matched to a given alternative, a larger committee means more
opportunities to satisfy the agents. For the Monroe rule, a larger committee may lead to a
lower total satisfaction. This happens if many agents like a particular alternative a lot, but
only some of them can be matched to this alternative and others have to be matched to
their less preferred ones. Nonetheless, we see that Algorithm C achieves C/Cideal = 0.925
even for K/m = 0.5 for the NetFlix data set.
Our conclusions from these experiments are the following. For the Monroe rule, even
Algorithm A achieves very good results. However, Algorithm C consistently achieves better
(indeed, almost perfect) ones. For the Chamberlin–Courant rule the randomized algorithm
on some datasets performs better than the deterministic ones. However, even in such cases,
the improvement over the Algorithm C is small.
5.4 Truncated ballots
The purpose of our third set of experiments was to see how our algorithm behave in practical
settings with truncated ballotrs. We conducted this part of evaluation on relatively large
instances, including n = 1000 agents and up to m = 100 alternatives. Thus, in this set
of experiments, we used the same sets of data as in the previous subsection: the Netflix
data set and the synthetic distributions. Similarly, we evaluated the same algorithms:
Algorithm A, C, and R for the case of Monroe’s system, and Algorithm C, and R for the
case of the Chamberlin–Courant system.
For each data set and for each algorithm we run experiments for 3 independent settings
with different values of the parameters describing the elections: (1) m = 100, K = 20, (2)
m = 100, K = 10, and (3) m = 20, K = 4. For each setting we run the experiments for the
values of P (the number of known positions) varying between 1 and m.
For each algorithm, data set, setting and each value of P we run 50 independent exper-
iments in the following way. From a data set we sampled a sub-profile of the appropriate
size n×m. We truncated this profile to the P first positions. We run the algorithm for the
truncated profile and calculated the quality ratio C/Cideal. When calculating C/Cideal we
assumed the worst case scenario, i.e., that the satisfaction of the agent from an alternative
outside of his/her first P positions is equal to 0. In other words, we used the positional
scoring function described by the following vector: 〈m− 1,m− 2, . . . ,m−P, 0, . . . 0〉. Next,
we averaged the values of C/Cideal over all 50 experiments.
The relation between the percentage of the known positions in the preference profile
and the average quality of the algorithm for the Monroe and Chamberlin–Courant systems
are plotted in Figures 13 and 14, respectively. We omit the plots for Mallow’s model, as in
this case we obtained almost identical results as for the Urn model. We have the following
conclusions.
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Figure 13: The relation between the percentage of known positions P/m [%] and the quality
of the algorithm C/Cideal for Algorithms C, A, and R for Monroe’s system. Each row of
the plots describes one algorithm; each column describes one data set; n = 1000. (Results
for the Mallows model are similar to those for the urn model and are omitted for clarity.)
1. All the algorithms require only small number of the top positions to achieve their best
quality. Here, the deterministic algorithms are superior.
2. The small elections with synthetic distributions appear to be the worst case scenario—
in such case we require the knowledge of about 40% of the top positions to obtain
the highest approximation ratios of the algorithms. In the case of the NetFlix data
set, even on small instances the deterministic algorithms require only about 8% of the
top positions to get their best quality (however the quality is already high for 3-5% of
the top positions). For the larger number of the alternatives, the algorithms do not
require more than 3% of the top positions to reach their top results.
3. Algorithm C does not only give the best quality but it is also most immune to the
lack of knowledge. These results are more evident for the case of the Monroe system.
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Figure 14: The relation between the percentage of known positions P/m [%] and the quality
of the algorithm C/Cideal for Algorithms C and R for the Chamberlin–Courant system. Each
row of the plots describes one algorithm; each column describes one data set; n = 1000.
(Results for the Mallows model are similar to those for the urn model and are omitted for
clarity.)
5.5 Running time
In our final set of experiments, we have measured running times of our algorithms on the
data set Mv. We have used a machine with Intel Pentium Dual T2310 1.46GHz processor
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Figure 15: The running time of the standard ILP solver for the Monroe and for the
Chamberlin–Courant systems. For Monroe’s system, for K = 9,m = 30, and for n ≥ 200
none of the single algorithm execution finished within 1 day.
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m = 10, K = 3 m = 10, K = 6
n = 2000 6000 10000 2000 6000 10000
M
on
ro
e
A 0.01 0.03 0.05 0.01 0.04 0.07
B 0.08 0.9 2.3 0.2 1.4 3.6
C 1.1 8 22 2.1 16 37
GM 0.8 7.3 20 1.9 13 52
R 7.6 50 180 6.5 52 140
C
C
C 0.02 0.07 0.12 0.05 0.14 0.26
GM 0.003 0.009 0.015 0.003 0.01 0.018
P 0.009 0.032 0.05 0.008 0.02 0.05
R 0.014 0.04 0.065 0.02 0.06 0.11
m = 100, K = 30 m = 100, K = 60
n = 2000 6000 10000 2000 6000 10000
M
on
ro
e
A 0.5 1.6 2.8 0.9 2.8 4.9
B 0.8 4 9.5 1.7 8 18
C 38 140 299 64 221 419
GM 343 2172 5313 929 5107 13420
R 41 329 830 88 608 1661
C
C
C 4.3 11 19 7.5 19 31
GM 0.06 0.2 0.4 0.09 0.3 0.7
P 0.03 0.1 0.26 0.03 0.1 0.2
R 0.06 0.24 0.45 0.1 0.4 0.8
Table 5: Example running times of the algorithms [in seconds].
and 1.5GB of RAM. In Figure 15 we show the running times of the GLPK ILP solver for
the Monroe and for Chamberlin–Courant rules. These running times are already large for
small instances and they are increasing exponentially with the number of voters. For the
Monroe rule, even for K = 9,m = 30, n = 100 some of the experiments timed out after
1 hour, and for K = 9,m = 30, n = 200 none of the experiments finished within one day.
Thus we conclude that the real application of the ILP-based algorithm is very limited.
Example running times of the other algorithms for some combinations of n, m, and
K are presented in Table 5. For the case of CC, essentially all the algorithms are very
fast and the quality of computed solutions is the main criterion in choosing among them.
For the case of Monroe, the situation is more complicated. While for small elections all
the algorithms are practical, for elections with thousands of voters, using Algorithm GM
becomes problematic. Indeed, even Algorithm C can be seen as a bit too slow if one expects
immediate results. On the other hand, Algorithms A and B seem perfectly practical and,
as we have seen in the previous experiments, give high-quality results.
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Monroe Chamberlin and Courant General model
dissat. satisfaction dissat. satisfaction dissat. satisfaction
u
til.
Inapprox.
Theorem 1
Good
approx.
Inapprox.
Theorem 3
Good
approx.
Inapprox.
Theorem 1
Theorem 3
Open problem
eg
a
l.
Inapprox.
Theorem 2
Inapprox.
Theorem 5
Inapprox.
Theorem 4
Inapprox.
Theorem 7
Inapprox.
Theorem 2
Theorem 4
Inapprox.
Theorem 5
Theorem 7
Table 6: Summary of approximability results for the Monroe and Chamberlin-Courant
multiwinner voting systems and for the general resource allocation problem.
6 Summary
We have defined a certain resource allocation problem and have shown that it generalizes
the problem of finding winners for the multiwinner voting rules of Monroe and of Cham-
berlin and Courant. Since it is known that the winners for these voting rules are hard to
compute [7,25,37,42,43], we focused on finding approximate solutions. We have shown that
if we try to optimize agents’ dissatisfaction, then our problems are hard to approximate up
to any constant factor. The same holds for the case where we focus on the satisfaction of
the least satisfied agent. However, for the case of optimizing total satisfaction, we suggest
good approximation algorithms. In particular, for the Monroe system we suggest a random-
ized algorithm that for the Borda score achieves an approximation ratio arbitrarily close to
0.715 (and much better in many real-life settings), and (1− 1
e
)-approximation algorithm for
arbitrary positional scoring function. For the Chamberlin-Courant system, we have shown
a polynomial-time approximation scheme (PTAS).
In Table 6 we present the summary of our (in)approximability results. In Table 7
we present specific results regarding our approximation algorithms for the utilitarian
satisfaction-based framework. In particular, the table clearly shows that for the case of
Monroe, Algorithms B and C are not much slower than Algorithm A but offer a chance of
improved peformance. Algorithm GM is intuitively even more appealing, but achieves this
at the cost of high time complexity. For the case of Chamberlin-Courant rule, theoretical
results suggest using Algorithm P (however, see below).
We have provided experimental evaluation of the algorithms for computing the winner
sets both for the Monroe and Chamberlin–Courant rules . While finding solutions for these
rules is computationally hard in the worst case, it turned out that in practice we can obtain
very high quality solutions using very simple algorithms. Indeed, both for the Monroe and
Chamberlin-Courant rules we recommend using Algorithm C (or Algorithm A on very large
Monroe elections). Our experimental evaluation confirms that the algorithms work very
well in case of truncated ballots. We believe that our results mean that (approximations
of) the Monroe and Chamberlin–Courant rules can be used in practice.
Our work leads to a number of further research directions. First, it would be very
interesting to find a better upper bound on the quality of solutions for the (satisfaction-
based) Monroe and Chamberlin–Courant systems (with Borda PSF) than the simple n(m−
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Algorithm Approximation Runtime Reference
M
o
n
ro
e
A 1− K−12(m−1) −
HK
K
Kmn Lemma 9
B as in Algorithm A Kmn+O(ΦS) Lemma 9
C as in Algorithm A dKmn+dO(ΦS) Lemma 9
GM as in Alg. A for Borda PSF;
1− 1
e
for others
KmO(ΦS) Theorem 13
R 12 (1 +
K
m
− K
2m−K3
m3−m2 )
| log(1−λ)|
Kǫ2
O(ΦS) Lemma 11
AR 0.715 max(A,R) Theorem 12
C
C
PTAS Theorem 15
P 1− 2w(K)
K
nmw(K) Lemma 14
GM 1− 1
e
Kmn Lu and Boutilier [25]
C as in Algorithm GM dKm(n+log dm) Lu and Boutilier [25]
R (1− 1
K+1 )(1 +
1
m
) | log(1−λ)|
ǫ2
n Oren [35]
Table 7: A summary of the algorithms studied in this paper. The top of the table regards
algorithms for Monroe’s rule and the bottom for the Chamberlin–Courant rule. In column
“Approximation” we give currently known approximation ratio for the algorithm under
Borda PSF, on profiles with m candidates and where the goal is to select a committee of
size K. Here, O(ΦS) = O(n2(K+logn)) is the complexity of finding a partial representation
function with the algorithm of Betzler et al. [7]. w(·) denotes Lambert’s W-Function.
1) bound that we use (where n is the number of voters and m is the number of candidates).
We use a different approach in our randomized algorithm, but it would be much more
interesting to find a deterministic algorithm that beats the approximation ratios of our
algorithms. One of the ways of seeking such a bound would be to consider Monroe’s rule
with “exponential” Borda PSF, that is, with PSF of the form, e.g., (2m−1, 2m−2, . . . , 1). For
such PSF our approach in the proof of Lemma 9 would not give satisfactory results and so
one would be forced to seek different attacks. In a similar vein, it would be interesting to
find out if there is a PTAS for Monroe’s system.
In our work, we have focused on PSFs that are strictly increasing/decreasing. It would
also be interesting to study PSFs which increase/decrease but not strictly, that is allowing
some equalities. We have started to work in this direction by considering the so-called t-
approval PSF’s αt, which (in the satisfaction-based variant) are defined as follows: αt(i) = 1
if i ≤ t and otherwise αt(i) = 0. Results for this case for the Chamberlin–Courant rule are
presented in the paper of Skowron and Faliszewski [42].
On a more practical side, it would be interesting to develop our study of truncated
ballots. Our results show that we can obtain very high approximation ratios even when
voters rank only relatively few of their top candidates. For example, to achieve 90% ap-
proximation ratio for the satisfaction-based Monroe system in Polish parliamentary election
(K = 460,m = 6000), each voter should rank about 8.7% of his or her most-preferred can-
didates. However, this is still over 500 candidates. It is unrealistic to expect that the voters
would be willing to rank this many candidates. Thus, how should one organize Monroe-
based elections in practice, to balance the amount of effort required from the voters and
the quality of the results?
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Finally, going back to our general resource allocation problem, we note that we do not
have any positive results for it (the negative results, of course, carry over from the more
restrictive settings). Is it possible to obtain some good approximation algorithm for the
resource allocation problem (in the utilitarian satisfaction-based setting) in full generality?
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